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Abstract. Digital platforms can be opened in two ways to promote innovation and value generation. A platform owner can open access for third-party participants by establishing boundary resources, such as APIs and an app store, to allow complements to be developed and shared for the platform. Furthermore, to foster cooperation with the complementors, the platform owner can use an open-source license boundary resource to open and share the platform's core resources. However, openness that is too wide renders the platform and its shared resources vulnerable to strategic exploitation. To our knowledge, platform strategies that promote such negative outcomes have remained unexplored in past research. We identify and analyze a prominent form of strategic exploitation called platform forking in which a hostile firm, i.e., a forker, bypasses the host's controlling boundary resources and exploits the platform's shared resources, core and complements, to create a competing platform business. We investigate platform forking on Google's Android platform, a successful open digital platform, by analyzing the fate of five Android forks and related exploitative activities. We observe several strategies that illustrate alternative ways of bundling a platform fork from a set of host, forker, and other resources. We also scrutinize Google's responses, which modified Android's boundary resources to curb exploitation and retain control. In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we present a theorization of the competitive advantage of open digital platforms and specifically expose platform forking as an exploitative and competitive platform strategy. Second, we extend platform governance literature by showing how boundary resources, which are mainly viewed as cooperative governance mechanisms, are also used to combat platform forking and thus sustain a platform's competitive advantage.

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Background: Oral factor XIa (FXIa) inhibitors may modulate coagulation to prevent thromboembolic events without significantly increasing bleeding. We explored the pharmacodynamics, safety, and efficacy of the oral FXIa inhibitor asundexian for secondary prevention after acute myocardial infarction (MI). Methods: We randomized 1601 patients with recent acute MI to oral asundexian 10, 20, or 50 mg or placebo once daily for 6–2 months in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, phase 2, dose-ranging trial. Patients were randomized within 5 days of their qualifying MI and received dual antiplatelet therapy with aspirin plus a P2Y12 inhibitor. The effect of asundexian on factor XIa inhibition was assessed at 4 weeks. The prespecified main safety outcome was Bleeding Academic Research Consortium type 2, 3, or 5 bleeding comparing all pooled asundexian doses with placebo. The prespecified efficacy outcome was a composite of cardiovascular death, MI, stroke, or stent thrombosis comparing pooled asundexian 20 and 50 mg doses with placebo. Results: The median age was 68 years, 23% were women, 51% had ST-elevation MI, 80% were treated with aspirin plus ticagrelor or prasugrel, and 99% underwent percutaneous coronary intervention before randomization. Asundexian caused dose-related inhibition of FXIa activity with 50 mg resulting in >90% inhibition. Over a median follow-up of 368 days, the main safety outcome occurred in 30 (7.6%), 32 (8.1%), 42 (10.5%), and 36 (9.0%) patients receiving asundexian 10, 20, 50 mg, and placebo (pooled asundexian vs. placebo: HR 0.98, 90% CI 0.71–1.35). The efficacy outcome occurred in 27 (6.8%), 24 (6.0%), 22 (5.5%), and 22 (5.5%) patients assigned asundexian 10, 20, 50 mg, and placebo (pooled asundexian 20 and 50 mg vs. placebo: HR 1.05, 90% CI 0.69–1.61). Conclusions: : In patients with recent acute MI, 3 doses of asundexian, when added to aspirin plus a P2Y12 inhibitor, resulted in dose-dependent, near-complete inhibition of FXIa activity without a significant increase in bleeding and a low rate of ischemic events. These data support the investigation of asundexian at a dose of 50 mg daily in an adequately powered clinical trial of patients following acute MI.

Based on an in-depth case study investigating the emergence of a normative institution, namely the diesel particulate filter (DPF) as a de facto standard for diesel cars in Germany, this paper develops a dualistic process model of institutional emergence which reflects the fundamental oppositional character of institutional actors involved in a series of framing contests. The proposed model features distinct phases punctuated by turning point mechanisms that shape the process leading to institutional emergence. Three specific turning point mechanisms were identified: local objectification, movement legitimacy and critical actors taking action. This model provides a novel perspective on institutional emergence in that it explains shifts in contestation and the emergence of an institution as a temporal resolution reached through coercion rather than out of a consensus as several institutionalization models assume. The results also suggest that the industry under attack from a social movement tends to deploy buffering strategies in an attempt to protect itself. Finally, we outline future directions for studying processes around contested fields and turning point mechanisms.