Turning Point Mechanisms in a Dualistic Process Model of Institutional Emergence: The Case of the Diesel Particulate Filter in Germany

Abstract

Based on an in-depth case study investigating the emergence of a normative institution, namely the diesel particulate filter (DPF) as a de facto standard for diesel cars in Germany, this paper develops a dualistic process model of institutional emergence which reflects the fundamental oppositional character of institutional actors involved in a series of framing contests. The proposed model features distinct phases punctuated by turning point mechanisms that shape the process leading to institutional emergence. Three specific turning point mechanisms were identified: local objectification, movement legitimacy and critical actors taking action. This model provides a novel perspective on institutional emergence in that it explains shifts in contestation and the emergence of an institution as a temporal resolution reached through coercion rather than out of a consensus as several institutionalization models assume. The results also suggest that the industry under attack from a social movement tends to deploy buffering strategies in an attempt to protect itself. Finally, we outline future directions for studying processes around contested fields and turning point mechanisms.

Public Opinion As a Source of Deinstitutionalization: A “Spiral of Silence” Approach

“…While previous literature has acknowledged functional, political, and social maintenance or challenge of institutional arrangements (Oliver, 1992;Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002), little has been said about the role of outsiders in this process (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). One premise of this literature is that institutional fields defend their existing practices by reacting en masse to outsider hostility (Maguire & Hardy, 2009;Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013), especially when key insiders have a strong interest in maintaining institutionalized practices (Fiss, Kennedy & Davis, 2012). However, discursive struggles around institutions usually happen simultaneously both within a field (Oliver, 1992) and outside, at the society level (Hauser, 1998), with one discourse influencing the other.…”

“…Coming back to the example of the German automotive industry (Guérard et al, 2013), the fear of Ford Germany's top executives materialized only when their peers from other Page 24 of 108 Academy of Management Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 firms started to threaten to seclude them. Coming back to the example of the German automotive industry (Guérard et al, 2013), the fear of Ford Germany's top executives materialized only when their peers from other Page 24 of 108 Academy of Management Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32...…”

“…In their study of car manufacturers, Guérard et al (2013) provide an exemplary case Page 68 of 108 Academy of Management Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 study on how pressure to conform to the field opinion can be exerted by members of a field. In an effort to abandon and replace an existing practice (the production of diesel cars that do not filter particular matters), a coalition of social movements introduced traffic light accreditation (green, yellow and red cards) for German car manufacturers.…”

“…Coming back to the example of the German automotive industry (Guérard et al, 2013), the fear of Ford Germany's top executives materialized only when their peers from other firms started to threaten to seclude them. Given that an institutional field is a network of social actors, the configuration of the field will influence the way social actors are linked and how they influence each other.…”

Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms: The Role of (Dys)Function in Long‐term Inter‐organizational Relationships

“…It is widely accepted that inter-organizational exchange performance is, in part, a consequence of the effective coordination of formal and informal governance mechanisms (e.g. Argyres and Mayer, 2007;Faems et al, 2008;Guérard, Bode and Gustafsson, 2013;Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Although the comparative functionality of different governance mechanisms has been extensively documented, their dynamic interplay (Cao and Lumineau, 2015;Zheng, Roehrich and Lewis, 2008) and, critically, their relative (dys)functionality over time remains less well understood.…”