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Delirium is a common complication in elderly CICU patients, and is associated with a longer and more complicated hospital stay and increased short and long-term mortality. Our findings suggest the usefulness of a protocol for the early identification of delirium in the CICU. Clinicaltrials.gov: NCT02004665.

The aim of this article is to describe the role played by accounting in an industrial company in which elements of utopian socialism and capitalism co-existed. The case is the Royal Silk Factory founded by King Ferdinand IV at San Leucio, near Caserta in 1778. The article covers the years 1802–1826. In this hybrid institution, double-entry bookkeeping (DEB) was adopted to calculate the minimum profit rate owed to the capitalist shareholders, while ‘labour accounting’ measured the workers’ performance. The surplus value was shared between the enterprise and the workers. This article makes a number of contributions to the accounting history literature: First, it adds archival evidence of accounting practices in Italian industrial companies; second, it supports the close connection between DEB and capitalism; third, it shows that the accounting system is set up to reflect the different social organisation of a manufacturing company; and finally, it illustrates how the accounting system makes the wealth-generating and wealth-distributing processes accountabl

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The aim of this paper is to explore the role played by cost accounting in Italy’s Industrial Mobilization system and in the largest firm manufacturing weaponry, Ansaldo of Genoa, during WWI. While in other countries such as the UK and the USA, efficiency in buying and managing war material was an important part of military strategy, in Italy, various factors impeded it. This paper focuses on contracting procedures adopted by the Ministry of War and Ministry of Munitions and looks at the cost accounting practices in Ansaldo to see how costs were determined and how prices were set. We found a paradox. On the one hand, despite knowledge of costing, the government did not impose cost controls on the producers of war material, nor on their profit rates. On the other hand, examining Ansaldo’s cost sheets we discover they underestimated their production costs leading the firm to losses despite its favorable political position. This paper contributes to the theoretical debate about the relationships between accounting and war in the Italian context where lobbying, collusion, bribery and private interests dominated the administrative behavior of public and private actors instead of efficiency, accountability and honesty