In 2 experiments, Ss judged whether numerous behaviors implied a target trait (intelligent or friendly) and then, on an ostensibly unrelated questionnaire, evaluated the overall desirability of some behaviors. Repeated behaviors were judged more quickly than new ones, even with 7 days between presentations. In addition, evaluations of previously judged behaviors that had evaluatively mixed implications were dominated by their implications for the practiced trait. This implicit memory effect occurred over a 7-day delay, even when Ss did not recognize that they had previously seen the behavior. Just as a general construct (e.g., a trait) can be made accessible by an individual's past experiences, a specific cue-construct linkage (e.g., a tendency to interpret a specific behavior in terms of a particular trait) can be facilitated for a long time, independent of conscious awareness, by making a single judgment.People get better at doing the things they practice. This principle is common knowledge, of course: We all know that a firstgrader who is learning to read by sounding out words letter-byletter will gradually increase his or her speed and fluency at reading. What is not so commonly recognized is the great specificity of the effect of practice. Reading a particular word contributes to the slow global accumulation of speed and reliability of the cognitive processes involved in reading. But it has a much greater effect on the child's ability to read that specific word when it is encountered again in the future.Practice effects are highly specific even in adults for whom general skills (such as reading) are well established. Reading a word once increases the person's ability to read the same word later in a perceptually degraded presentation (e.g., with some letters omitted or presented in a brief flash) for as long as 16 months after the initial presentation (Sloman, Hayman

Largely drawing on thefindings and reasoning of Milgram (1974). a laboratory experiment was conducted to assess the impact of authoritative directives and actor observability on the use of race as a selection criterion in hiring. A significant main effect for instructions was found, suggesting that, when told by a superior to do so, members of organizations may use race as a criterion in making hiring decisions. The precise form of this compliance effect varied, however, as a function of the type of dependent variable under consideration [attitudinal (i.e., ratings of Black job candidates) vs. behavioral (i.e., number of Black candidates chosen for final job interviews)]. N o effects for actor observability were detected. These results are discussed in terms of their theoretical, methodological, and practical implications in regard to organizational wrongdoing, particularly institutional racism.

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