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The influence on memory research of levels of processing (Craik & I^ockharl, 1972) is reviewed, and a number of conceptual and empirical criticisms are evaluated. Research since 1972 has enabled the original formulation of depth of processing to be refined in various ways, and the concepts of elaboration and distinctiveness of encoding are discussed as examples of this refinement. It is concluded that, despite change and development, many of the original ideas of levels of processing have survived and that as a research framework it has been substantially successful in encouraging the building of a dala base that can serve as a foundation for future theory construction.

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Four experiments examined differences in probabilistic reasoning as a function of whether problems were presented in a frequentist or case-specific form. The experiments demonstrated that these different forms influence the likelihood of Ss committing the conjunction and disjunction fallacies. The authors contend that these 2 forms elicit different approaches to probability. Frequency problems, it is argued, elicit a distributional approach in which probabilities are equated with relative frequencies, whereas case-specific problems elicit a singular approach in which probabilities are equated with the propensities or causal forces operating in an individual case. According to this account, distributional and singular approaches evoke different kinds of inferential rules and heuristic procedures, some of which are more closely aligned with extensional principles than others.