Indeterminate art, in which familiar objects are only suggestive, invokes a perceptual conundrum as apparently detailed and vivid images resist identification. We hypothesized that compared with paintings that depict meaningful content, object recognition in indeterminate images would be delayed, and tested whether aesthetic affect depends on meaningful content. Subjects performed object recognition and judgment of aesthetic affect tasks. Response latencies were significantly longer for indeterminate images and subjects perceived recognizable objects in 24% of these paintings. Although the aesthetic affect rating of all paintings was similar, judgement latencies for the indeterminate paintings were significantly longer. A surprise memory test revealed that more representational than indeterminate paintings were remembered and that affective strength increased the probability of subsequent recall. Our results suggest that perception and memory of art depend on semantic aspects, whereas, aesthetic affect depends on formal visual features. The longer latencies associated with indeterminate paintings reflect the underlying cognitive processes that mediate object resolution. Indeterminate art works therefore comprise a rich set of stimuli with which the neural correlates of visual perception can be investigated.

Little is known about how we perceive the size and shape of objects in far peripheral vision. Observations made during an artistic study of visual space suggest that objects appear smaller and compressed in the periphery compared with central vision. To test this, we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1, we asked participants to draw how a set of peripheral discs appeared when viewed peripherally without time or eye movement constraints. In Experiment 2, we used the method of constant stimuli to measure when a briefly presented peripheral stimulus appeared bigger or smaller compared with a central fixated one. In Experiment 3, we measured how accurate participants were in discriminating shapes presented briefly in the periphery. In Experiment 1, the peripheral discs were reported as appearing significantly smaller than the central disc, and as having an elliptical or polygonal contour. In Experiment 2, participants judged the size of peripheral discs as being significantly smaller when compared with the central disc across most of the peripheral field, and in Experiment 3, participants were quite accurate in reporting the shape of the peripheral object, except in the far periphery. Our results show that objects in the visual periphery are perceived as diminished in size when presented for long and brief exposures, suggesting diminution is an intrinsic feature of the structure of the visual space. Shape distortions, however, are reported only with longer exposures.

Preference for curvature has been demonstrated using many types of stimuli, but it remains an open question whether curvature plays a relevant role in responses to original artworks. To investigate this, a novel set of paintings was created, consisting of three variations-curved, sharp-angled, and mixed-of the same 16 indeterminate subjects. The present research aimed to differentiate between liking and wanting decisions. We assessed liking both online (Study 1) and in the lab (Study 2, Task 2), using a continuous slider and a dichotomous forced choice, respectively. In both tasks, participants assigned higher ratings to the curved compared to the sharp-angled version of the paintings. Similarly, when participants were explicitly asked if they wanted to take the paintings home, they assigned higher wanting ratings to the curved version (Study 2, Task 3). However, when they were asked to act as a curator selecting the works they wanted for their gallery (Study 2, Task 4) and to make a physical effort to visually consume the painting (implicit wanting; Study 2, Task 1), no significant difference was found. Finally, we found that implicit wanting decisions did not predict liking for paintings, while liking predicted explicit wanting of the artworks in both the home and art contexts. This confirmed that it is possible to differentiate between liking and wanting responses to artistically relevant stimuli. We conclude that this theoretical distinction helps to explain previous conflicting results on the curvature effect, establishing a new line of research in the field of empirical aesthetics.

To explain consciousness as a physical process we must acknowledge the role of energy in the brain. Energetic activity is fundamental to all physical processes and causally drives biological behavior. Recent neuroscientific evidence can be interpreted in a way that suggests consciousness is a product of the organization of energetic activity in the brain. The nature of energy itself, though, remains largely mysterious, and we do not fully understand how it contributes to brain function or consciousness. According to the principle outlined here, energy, along with forces and work, can be described as actualized differences of motion and tension. By observing physical systems, we can infer there is something it is like to undergo actualized difference from the intrinsic perspective of the system. Consciousness occurs because there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain.

In cubist paintings by Picasso, Braque and Gris it is possible to detect everyday objects like guitars, bottles or jugs, although they are often difficult to decipher. In this art-science collaborative study we found that participants without expertise in cubism appreciated cubist artworks more if they were able to detect concealed objects in them. The finding of this strong correlation between detectability and preference offers wide implications for art history and human cognition as it points to a mechanism that allows us to derive pleasure from searching for and finding meaningful patterns.

In this article I will discuss the intersection between art and neuroscience from the perspective of a practicing artist. I have collaborated on several scientific studies into the effects of art on the brain and behavior, looking in particular at the phenomenon of “visual indeterminacy.” This is a perceptual state in which subjects fail to recognize objects from visual cues. I will look at the background to this phenomenon, and show how various artists have exploited its effect through the history of art. My own attempts to create indeterminate images will be discussed, including some of the technical problems I faced in trying to manipulate the viewer's perceptual state through paintings. Visual indeterminacy is not widely studied in neuroscience, although references to it can be found in the literature on visual agnosia and object recognition. I will briefly review some of this work and show how my attempts to understand the science behind visual indeterminacy led me to collaborate with psychophysicists and neuroscientists. After reviewing this work, I will discuss the conclusions I have drawn from its findings and consider the problem of how best to integrate neuroscientific methods with artistic knowledge to create truly interdisciplinary approach.

This paper addresses an issue that has been studied from both scientific and art theoretical perspectives, namely the dichotomous nature of representational artworks. Representational artworks are dichotomous in that they present us with two distinct aspects at once. In one aspect we are aware of what is represented while in the other we are aware of the material from which the representation is composed. The dichotomy arises due the incompatibility, indeed contradiction, between these aspects of awareness, both of which must be present if we are to fully appreciate the artwork. Examples from art history are given to show how artists have exploited this dichotomy in a way that conditions our response to their work. I hypothesize that the degree of manifest dichotomy in a work determines the strength of its aesthetic effect, and propose this could be experimentally tested. I conclude that scientific studies of aesthetic experience should take the dichotomous nature of artworks into account.

It has long been hypothesized that perceptual ambiguities play an important role in aesthetic experience: A work with some ambiguity engages a viewer more than one that does not. However, current frameworks for testing this theory are limited by the availability of stimuli and data collection methods. This article presents an approach to measuring the perceptual ambiguity of a collection of images. Crowdworkers are asked to describe image content, after different viewing durations. Experiments are performed using images created with Generative Adversarial Networks, using the Artbreeder website. We show that text processing of viewer responses can provide a fine-grained way to measure and describe image ambiguities.