We examine the determinants of control rights in biotechnology alliances through three case studies and a quantitative analysis. Aghion and Tirole [1994] argue that control rights will be assigned so as to maximize the value of the ¢nal output, as long as the R&D ¢rm has su¤cient ¢nancial resources. Consistent with this framework, the allocation of control rights to the R&D ¢rm increases with the ¢rm's ¢nancial resources. The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between control rights and the stage of the project at the time the alliance is signed is more ambiguous.

law schools. They contributed helpful advice, but none of the shortcomings that may remain. We are grateful for support from the Julius Silver Program in Law, Science and Technology at the Columbia Law School, and from the Sloan Foundation through its funding of the Consortium on Competition and Cooperation. 1. For example, some years ago there was extensive discussion of the advantages of funneling patent claims through a special patent court. These discussions resulted in the establishment in 1982 of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See,

We offer description and analysis of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Surveythe first comprehensive survey of patenting and entrepreneurship in the United States-summarizing the responses of 1,332 early-stage technology companies founded since 1998. Our results show that entrepreneurs have varied and subtle reasons for using the patent system, many of which diverge from the traditional theory that patents provide an "incentive to invent." Somewhat surprisingly, startup executives report that patents generally provide relatively weak incentives to conduct innovative activities. But while a substantial share of early-stage companies hold no patents, we also find that holding patents is more widespread than previously reported, with patenting patterns and motives being highly industry, technology, and context specific. When early-stage companies patent, they are often seeking competitive advantage, and the associated goals of preventing technology copying, securing financing, and enhancing reputation. We find substantial differences between the health-related sectors (biotechnology and medical devices), in which patents are more commonly used and considered important, and the software and Internet fields, in which patents are reported to be less useful. Startups with venture funding hold more patents regardless of industry, although unlike software companies, venture-backed IT hardware firms show a patenting pattern more similar to that of health-related firms. When choosing not to patent major innovations, early-stage companies often cite to cost considerations, and report substantially higher patenting costs than the

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As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this