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We use data from the past 30 years of takeover activity in the U.S. banking industry to test competing neoclassical and misvaluation merger theories. Test results are consistent with evidence in the literature that merger activity is significantly related to both structural industry change and stock price misvaluation. Our primary contribution is to show that changes in misvaluation reflect a rise in industry-wide risk taking and that increases in risk originate from changes in industry structure due to deregulation. A measure of bank risk taking subsumes the power of stock price misvaluation to explain subsequent merger activity.

In this article we examine the U.S. telecommunications industry during a period of rapid deregulation to determine the effects of a deregulatory shock on industry competition and merger activity. We show that merger activity exhibits a clear wave-like pattern, regardless of the listing status of the participants. Increased competition and IPO activity following deregulation increased cash-flow volatility and probability of exit while the introduction of new technology increased dispersion of economic efficiency across the industry. These changes resulted in a significant increase in merger activity. Competition also played an important role in shaping "who buys whom?" JEL Classification: G34, G38

Using Federal Reserve bank stress test announcements, we examine when option traders acquire informational advantage and when they exploit it. We find consistent evidence of informed options trading around announcements. However, when test results are announced in successive weeks we find high abnormal option volume, considerably positive abnormal returns and significant return predictability in the first week, but not the following week. This suggests that informed option traders are able to anticipate upcoming news events and skillfully process public information but it also suggests that trading on acquired information is conditioned on the level of information asymmetry in the market.