The public discussion of executive compensation often centres on 'fair' and 'unfair' amounts and the public outrage over compensation that is deemed too high. The academic literature states that such outrage can lead to outrage costs, pressuring firms to adjust compensation levels. However, it is unclear what a 'fair' compensation is for various stakeholders and how their fairness concerns relate to outrage constraints. Based on surveys among two key stakeholder groups (representative eligible voters and investment professionals), we provide evidence that fairness is an important criterion for both groups but that opinions on how large a fair compensation amount should be are widely dispersed. Moreover, personality traits systematically influence fairness opinions through self-serving interpretations of distributive justice and personal risk attitudes, indicating that a 'fair' amount of executive compensation may strongly depend on the involved stakeholders. Investigating thresholds for outrage, i.e., amounts above which compensation is judged 'unfairly' high, we show that even though investment professionals care for fairness as well, 'capital market outrage' might not equate to 'public outrage' . Our paper contributes to the literature on outrage constraints by linking individual fairness concerns to outrage potential and has implications for transparency of executive compensation and research on shareholder activism.
This study investigates when and why intrayear bonus target revisions occur. This is important as intrayear target revisions occur regularly in practice but are not well understood. Specifically, we analyze two potential drivers of intrayear bonus target revisions: reduced managerial incentives owing to managers dropping out of the incentive zone of their piecewise defined bonus function and potential spillovers from planning target revisions that reflect changes in performance expectations during the year. We also investigate the effects of organizational characteristics on intrayear bonus target revisions. Using data collected from sales executives via multiple waves of surveys, we find evidence for both predicted drivers. In addition, consistent with our predictions, we find that the levels of delegated decision authority, intrafirm interdependencies, and information asymmetry negatively moderate the positive association between reduced managerial incentives and revision likelihood. Our paper contributes to the target setting literature by being the first study to investigate intrayear bonus target revisions and shed light on when firms commit to not revising such targets intrayear.
Using an experiment, we investigate whether job candidates' noncontractible effort promises increase their actual effort in the work relationship when the labor market is competitive. Due to promise-keeping preferences, individuals tend to keep promises even if doing so is costly. However, when promises can be made strategically to influence hiring decisions, it is unclear whether workers are less likely to keep their promises. We develop theory to predict that making effort promises matters even more when labor markets are competitive. We find workers promise higher effort levels when competing for a job than when they do not, but do not keep promises to a lesser extent although the costs of promise-keeping increase with the promise size, thereby increasing the total effort provided. The results enhance our understanding of the effects of worker-employer communication during hiring, particularly in a competitive setting in which such communication is most likely to occur.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.