The Chemical Processing Industry (CPI) has witnessed growth in Mechanical Integrity (MI) programs, which have evolved from standards‐based compliance, to continuous improvement programs, and on to risk‐based programs. For instance, operators (i.e., manufacturers) have redesigned corporate standards, plant‐level procedures and field practices to keep pace with incident learnings and recommended practices, such as those espoused by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Furthermore, the property insurance industry has duly taken note of this MI evolution, giving rise to a significantly greater focus on MI programs during insurance surveys and inspections. Meanwhile, incident investigators remain in demand as incidents with MI‐related causes continue to occur in the CPI. This apparent disconnect naturally raises questions in regards to subjects such as “risk based inspection (RBI),” “reliability centered maintenance (RCM),” “industry best practice,” and “inspection, testing and preventive maintenance (ITPM).” MI programs play a considerably important role in the process safety lifecycle of equipment. The engineering design phase of a project may be on the order of just days, up to several years for a complete plant. Procurement and construction typically follow a similar timeline proportionate with the engineering design phase. However, once a facility becomes fully operational, the time devoted toward operation and maintenance will normally far out‐weigh the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) period, and may last for many decades. As such, the process safety equipment lifecycle (PSEL) may be largely governed by the MI program. The PSEL is explained in this article, with an examination of the central elements which should be embraced by a comprehensive MI program. While the article demonstrates the breadth and depth of MI, it aptly proposes a practical approach toward the management system that forms the foundation of a robust MI program. The proposed framework leverages the Onion Skin diagram in the context of the equipment lifecycle to create an intuitive approach to MI management. This management system framework is comprehensive, sound, and practical for implementation at facilities of most any size. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 264–272, 2017
Hazard identification training (HIT) programs have been used in the chemical processing industry to raise awareness with employees on what constitutes a process hazard and techniques for identifying these hazards. Quite often these HIT programs will deliver the course material to the participants as classroom instruction, computer‐based training, organized field reviews, or a combination of these formats. These presentations tend to be one‐time efforts or cyclic programs that reach the target audience on some periodic basis (e.g., triennially). Although the content of the course material may be educational, these programs often have limited success because of their inability to make a lasting impression with the participants. Organizational and personnel changes, employee turnover, vanishing corporate memory, and shifting priorities can all have an undermining effect on the well‐intended efforts of traditional HIT programs. The challenge thus becomes finding ways to keep the knowledge both relevant and current, to effect lasting cultural change in a dynamic environment. This article presents a unique HIT program known as “Spot the Hazard,” which uses the facility's intranet to reinforce the concepts taught in the classroom. Spot the Hazard blends photographic examples and technical knowledge with aspects of behavior modification. The photographs that are presented have not been staged and thus are germane to the employees. The inherent on‐going nature of the program ensures the knowledge remains current, while at the same time it provides a platform for making a positive cultural change. The concepts of Spot the Hazard are explained in greater detail in the current article, along with a representative number of actual examples. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2009
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) has quickly gained acceptance in the chemical processing industries and has risen to be one of the leading risk assessment techniques used for process safety studies. LOPA generally uses more rigor and science than what is encountered with qualitative risk assessments, while still not becoming overly onerous when compared with detailed quantitative risk assessments. In the interest of balancing time and resources against science and accuracy, certain tradeoffs and assumptions are made within the LOPA assessment. In turn, these tradeoffs and assumptions can lead to inaccurate conclusions. For example, one issue that arises is with the treatment of protection layers associated with mitigation of consequences. LOPA teams have a choice to account for mitigation layers in the consequence assignment or alternatively treat these layers as independent protection layers (IPLs). Although this may appear to be an inconsequential decision, it can in fact result in very different conclusions. In the course of treating mitigation layers as IPLs, organizations must ensure the necessary inspection, testing, and preventive maintenance practices are in place for these layers. Furthermore, recognizing this dichotomy in treatment, one can also show that these mitigation layers should be designed so as to achieve a balance between consequence reduction and desired reliability. This article discusses alternative treatments of risk mitigation layers that are commonly applied by LOPA teams and demonstrates their impacts through case studies. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011
The availability, collection, and proper application of accurate and complete Basic Design Data (BDD) are essential aspects of Loss Prevention practice. This article presents a case study to illustrate the importance of properly collecting and applying accurate BDD when designing Fired Equipment. In the case study presented, an explosion occurred inside a newly installed Catalytic Thermal Oxidizer (CatOx) shortly after initial start-up. Root cause investigation revealed that the project team, in the design and specification of the CatOx control system, had misapplied the BDD. Consequently, this led to operation of the CatOx within the flammability envelope of the particular system, resulting in an explosion.This article provides a brief discussion of BDD and its application. The case study is presented in detail using flammability diagrams for the system to demonstrate where the CatOx was intended to operate versus where it actually operated during the incident. The discussion leads the reader through the incident lifecycle, from the conceptual design of the CatOx, through the Engineering and Commissioning phases, and into the Incident Investigation. The conclusions drawn from this incident further emphasize the value of accurate BDD to the design and operation of Fired Equipment.
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