There is considerable criminological interest in the place of emotion in influencing views about crime and punishment. It is increasingly recognised that while politicians insist that it is ‘evidence’ that guides their policy, this claim obscures some of the emotional influences on attitudes to crime and punishment. Yet the scholarly debate has been limited by, first, an exaggerated and contrived distinction between emotion and cognition; and, second, an over-general conception of emotion which loses some critical distinctions among different types. Specifically, the emotions of punishment meet the defining criteria of moral emotions. Some of the ways in which crime and punishment may trigger our moral emotions are discussed and the ‘moral foundations’, postulated by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, are applied to an understanding of views about punishment. This analysis explains why views about punishment are often defended so tenaciously and debate is unsatisfactory and ill-tempered. An appreciation of the influences that shape attitudes to crime and punishment is a precondition of trying to change them.
Policy debate assumes the point of probation is to administer community punishment, reduce reoffending and protect the public. Dominant punitive and instrumental understandings of probation's work have regarded the human rights of offenders as of secondary importance or even as obstacles to attaining these objectives. This article argues that, on the contrary, policy and practice should be grounded on human rights rather than on direct endeavours for effectiveness. It advances a personal and ethical understanding of probation and, considering probation's principal tasks of enforcement, rehabilitation and public protection, argues that a respectful professional relationship is indispensable, though threatened by punitive and instrumental approaches. The concept of obliquity -the idea that some of our most important goals are best achieved indirectly -can explain how a personal approach can turn out not only to respect ethical entitlements, but indeed to be more effective in the terms that probation sets for itself.This article argues that contemporary policy debates in England and Wales understand and value probation for its punitive and instrumental achievements and potential. The point and worth of probation are taken to be its punitive capacity to deliver punishment in the community or (and/or) its instrumental achievements in administering (or sometimes commissioning) rehabilitative interventions to reduce reconviction or working to protect the public from further serious offending. It is envisaged that probation could and should do better in these respects, but the idea that these constitute its worth and purpose are bedrock assumptions shared by most commentators. I shall argue that there
At a time of extensive international exchange in probation policies and practices, this paper considers the opportunities and challenges of penal policy transfer. Using Ian Hacking's metaphor of an ecological niche, it is proposed that a number of inter-related vectors constitute an environment in which a transfer might thrive (or fail). A preliminary attempt is made to identify some of these influences. It is argued that the success criteria of transfer have been insufficiently discussed. Transfer can fail, but can also become corrupted. It is proposed that the enhancement of human rights is the single most important criterion for evaluating transfer.
With the important exception of critiques of rehabilitation, philosophers of punishment do not often have probation as their focus. This (relative) neglect is mutual: when probation policymakers, scholars and practitioners reflect upon their own work, practices and values, the insights of the philosophy of punishment are rarely among their chosen resources. This paper attempts to make some connections and to point to some ways in which a fuller engagement might shed a different light on some familiar questions in the philosophy of punishment and enrich thinking about the work of probation.
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