This article analyzes the bubble in property values across cities in the United States from 1999 through 2005. We find evidence of momentum in house price growth (relative to growth in rents) away from the underlying fundamentals throughout the 1980–2005 period; however, momentum increased after 1999. We find that the bubble happened mostly after 2003; it was for a relatively short period and was characterized by a series of positive, seemingly random, shocks that were associated with the surge in the subprime market and the decline in short-term interest rates. Before that price changes were reasonably well explained by the fundamentals, particularly the decline in long‐term interest rates in the early part of the bubble period. We do not find evidence of a tendency for prices relative to rents to revert to a long‐run trend.

US mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent years. An important part of the change has been the rise of the “subprime” market, characterized by loans with high default rates, dominance by specialized subprime lenders rather than full-service lenders, and little coverage by the secondary mortgage market. In this paper, we examine these and other “stylized facts” with standard tools used by financial economists to describe market structure in other contexts. We use three models to examine market structure: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing in which we argue that subprime options are different from prime options, causing different contracts and prices; and two models based on asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and one with the asymmetry between lenders and the secondary market. In both of the asymmetric-information models, investors set up incentives for borrowers or loan sellers to reveal information, primarily through costs of rejection. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2004asymmetric information, licensing, option-pricing, secondary market, signaling, subprime mortgage market,

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