Dominant personality models of the self-concept (e.g. self-schema theory) conceive of the self as a relatively stable cognitive representation or schema. The self-schema controls how we process selfrelevant information across a myriad of situations. Conversely, self-categorization theory argues that self-perception is highly variable and context-dependent. It was hypothesized in two studies (N ¼ 114 and 200) that the effect of personal self-schemas on information-processing would be eliminated when the context makes a conflicting higher-order identity salient. Results largely supported selfcategorization theory. Across various dependent measures (trait endorsements, response latencies, and confidence in self-descriptions), participants generally responded in line with the salient identity, even if this pattern of responding directly contradicted their personal self-schema. Implications for dominant personality models of the self-concept are examined. Copyright # 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This paper examines the nature of the self-concept, in particular whether the self is a fluid or stable entity. The fluidity issue is addressed by comparing and contrasting two influential theories of the self, namely self-schema theory (Markus, 1977(Markus, , 1990) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1999;Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). On the one hand, self-schema theory and social cognition models more generally ascribe a great deal of stability to the self-system. On the other hand, selfcategorization theory conceptualizes the self as a highly dynamic process. The present research extends previous work in both research traditions. In two related studies we test whether selfperception is a context-dependent process, or the manifestation of enduring personality traits or selfschemas.
SELF-SCHEMA THEORYSelf-schema theory maintains that the core self comprises our self-schemas-'knowledge structures developed by individuals to understand and explain their own social experiences' (Markus & Sentis, 1982, p. 45). It is assumed that we develop these self-structures for our most centrally-defining attributes. For one person independence may be a centrally-defining attribute, while for another creativity or extroversion may be central (Markus, 1977;Markus & Sentis, 1982). Self-schemas are stable self-representations; they facilitate information-processing such that individuals quickly accept congruent information and reject incongruent information (Markus, 1977). Despite the theory's initial emphasis on stability, self-schema theorists later sought to render the model more dynamic by introducing the concept of a working self-concept (Markus & Nurius, 1986;Markus & Wurf, 1987). The working self was conceived as a temporary structure that contains one's currently active self-aspect. Moreover, the malleability of the self-system was attributed to the varying accessibility of self-aspects that surround the core elements (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Thus the revised model retained the idea that self-schemas are sta...
