The paper takes up the relationship between teleological explanation and psychology. Teleological explanation-given in terms of purpose, intention, and value-is generally viewed unfavorably in psychology and science broadly. Biophysical mechanistic explanations are generally regarded as more scientific. The paper argues that the contemporary hostility to teleology needs to be understood in the context of the early modern political-philosophical struggles against organized religion. European philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw that teleology was an essential part of how organized religion justified its political power. René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza are analyzed as philosophers who both attacked teleology, and contributed to the critique of organized religion. The early modern attack on teleology and the development of mechanistic science thus both had political as well as philosophical motivations. The tension between teleological and mechanistic explanation is shown to persist into the present, with the work of Carl Rogers and B.F. Skinner used as more recent examples. Rogers argued that humanistic psychology required a teleological understanding of both human and cosmic processes, whereas Skinner staunchly denied the reality of teleology and unfailingly championed behavioral, mechanistic science. Both Rogers' and Skinner's claims, moreover, can be traced to the early modern attack on teleology. It is then shown that contemporary research continues to grapple with the question of teleology. More specifically, the paper claims that contemporary writing fails to distinguish adequately between extrinsic and intrinsic teleology. The paper concludes advocating for a serious reckoning with the problem of teleology, and claims it is essential for genuinely scientific psychology.