How did the three Nordic European Union member states approach their periods as holders of the European Union (EU) Council Presidency? Two radically different predictions about the impact of the Presidency on member state behaviour can be found in the literature. Some maintain that the position functions as an amplifier, strengthening the already existing tendency to propagate national concerns. Others argue that the Presidency functions as a silencer, subordinating national material interests to the benefit of common European concerns. In this article we analyse the ways in which Finland, Sweden and Denmark actually performed the Presidency role. Which of the competing interpretations is most appropriate? Was the Presidency role performed differently by the three countries? Our main finding is that the Presidency generally functioned as an amplifier during the Nordic presidencies. There are, however, interesting differences between the three states, Denmark being the least constrained in using the Presidency to further national interests whereas Finland was most anxious not to violate norms of impartiality and neutrality, even in cases where such behaviour ran contrary to national interests.

This article utilizes role theory for analysing the role(s) of the European Union (EU) in global politics. Specifically addressing the interplay of the EU's own role perception and the role expectations held by other actors, the article contributes two case studies of the role(s) of the EU in relation to two important but different actor groupings-Eastern Europe including Russia and the ACP countries in the developing world, respectively. The analysis points to the tensions that exist between selfperceptions and the perceptions of the EU's counterparts in Eastern Europe and the developing world, and how these tensions influences the interaction between the actors.The European Union increasingly aspires to play a leading role in global politics. It engages itself in negotiations, cooperation schemes, and conflict resolution processes with a vast number of actors utilizing an expanding set of tools. Due to its unique nature, the EU is often said to be different great power. The degree to which it succeeds in its great power ambitions is a complex matter, however, related to both the character of the issue-area in focus (for instance in terms of EU competence and resources and the relative strength of other actors) and how it is perceived by others on the international scene.The aim of this article is to investigate the EU's role(s) as an international actor. Utilizing role theory, we analyse both the EU's own role perception and the role expectations held by outsiders. We are interested in three interrelated aspects-the constitutive elements of a common EU role conception, possible role competition, and the degree of coherence between role conceptions and perceived role performance. Special attention is paid to the alleged normative power role of the EU and how, if at all, this role is reflected in outsiders' perceptions. We include case studies of the Union's roles in its relations with two important actor constellations: its eastern neighbors, notably Russia, and its ''partners'' in the developing world, specifically the ACP countries (the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states). We posit that the complex and dynamic interplay between an actor's own role conception, on the one hand, and the structurally guided role expectations of others, on the other hand, constitutes a main advantage of role theory and speaks directly to the issue of integrating foreign policy analysis and international relations theory.

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The Covid 19 pandemic has put the issue of public trust at the centre of political analysis. This article inquires into the level of public trust in Sweden concerning current crisis management as well as preparedness for future crises. The empirical basis for this study consists of unique data generated through two surveys on the Covid 19 virus conducted during 2020 in Sweden. Respondents were asked to assess their trust in different actors' crisis management. In addition, the first survey asked about how the actions of different actors impact on the forward-oriented trust held in Swedish emergency preparedness for a future severe crisis. Four key findings stand out. First, the results display rather weak levels of interpersonal trust. Second, a surprisingly high level of institutional trust can be found during the initial phase of the pandemic. Simultaneously we see somewhat decreasing levels of trust later during the pandemic. The results include interesting variations across age, gender and education. Third, relating the results to earlier research on trust in Sweden, the results contain indications of stable trust levels despite the all but stable contextual conditions. Fourth, the analysis shows important variations in trust levels among different institutions and layers of government.