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In March 2013 a large shipment of maize, intended for feed was subject of an alert in the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed of the European Commission (EC) because the aflatoxin B1 (AFB1) level in the load exceeded the EC regulated maximum level of 20 μg/kg. Since the shipment had passed import controls and was already distributed (mainly to German farms), a massive recall followed. The aim of the current study was to investigate questions, raised by authorities and industry, related to the effectivity of EU sampling procedures, the influence of sample homogenisation procedures and sample storage conditions on the test results, and fungal identification as unexpected mycotoxins were identified during this study. The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority seized a shipload of maize in July 2013, suspected to be contaminated with AFB1. The shipload was sampled according to the 2009 and 2013 EC Sampling Regulations to compare the outcomes of both sampling protocols. Mycotoxin analysis of the incremental samples showed high mean levels of AFB1, aflatoxin G1 (AFG1), and ochratoxin A (OTA). Also an extreme inhomogeneous distribution of aflatoxins and OTA was proven. Analysis of samples homogenised according to the slurry method showed improved performance as compared to samples homogenised through dry homogenisation. Sampling and sample homogenisation according to the Regulation from 2013 showed a closer estimate of the ‘true’ AFB1 content as compared to sampling according to the Regulation from 2009. No influence of laboratory storage conditions on AFB1 concentration could be determined. Fungal identification revealed Aspergillus flavus as the main source of AFB1 in this shipment. Infrequent occurrence of Aspergillus parasiticus might have been the source of AFG1. The occurrence of sometimes large amounts of OTA could not be explained, however it was suggested that Aspergillus welwitschiae might have played a role.

International audienceHigh levels of dioxins (PCDD/Fs) in pork were discovered in France and the Netherlands at the end of 2008. The contamination was rapidly traced back to a feed stock in the Republic of Ireland (RoI). Burning oil, used for drying of bakery waste, appeared to be spoiled with PCBs. As a consequence, very high levels up to 500 pg TEQ g-1 fat were found in pork. The congener pattern clearly pointed to PCB-oil as a source but the ratio between the non-dioxin-like indicator PCBs (PCBs 28, 52, 101, 138, 152 and 180) and PCDD/Fs was much lower than observed during the Belgian incident, thereby limiting the suitability of indicator PCBs as a marker for the presence of dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs. This paper describes the tracking and tracing of the incident, the public-private cooperation, the surveillance activities, and its results. A major lesson to be learned from this incident is the importance of good private food safety systems. In this incident, it was the private surveillance systems that identified the origin of contamination within 10 days after the first signal of increased dioxin levels in a product. On the other hand, retrospective analyses showed that signals were missed that could have led to an earlier detection of the incident and the source. Above all, the incident would not have occurred when food safety assurance systems had been effectively implemented in the involved feed chain. It is discussed that besides primary responsibility for effective private food safety systems, the competent authorities have to supervise whether the food safety procedures are capable of coping with these kinds of complex food safety issues, while private food companies need to implement the law, and public authorities should supervise and enforce them. Finally it is discussed whether the health risks derived from consumption of the contaminated batches of meat may have been underestimated during the incident, due to the unusually high intake of dioxins

No abstract

Different compound feeds have to be manufactured in the same production line. As a consequence, traces of the first produced feed may remain in the production and get mixed with the next feed batches. This "carry-over" is unavoidable, and so non-medicated feed can be contaminated with veterinary drugs like antibiotics added to the previous batch of medicated feed. To monitor the carry-over of antibiotics in the Netherlands, 21 feed mills were visited and 140 samples of flushing feeds were collected and analysed for containing residues of antibiotics. Results show that 87% of all samples contain concentrations of antibiotics in the range of 0.1-154 mg/kg. It is expected that these levels - which are in the same range as previously found for the nowadays banned antimicrobial growth promoters (AMGPs) - have an effect on the occurrence of microbial resistance. Analysis of a second set of samples collected at four different feed mills directly after the production of oxytetracycline-medicated feed demonstrated that the first part of a flushing feed has much higher contamination than the last part of the batch. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the carry-over percentage shows no correlation with the carry-over determined by one of the standard GMP+ procedures. These observations, unavoidable carry-over, inhomogeneous batches of feed with antibiotics and difficulties to predict the carry-over levels, together with the awareness of the increasing problem of microbial resistance, motivated the NEVEDI, association of Dutch Feed Producers, to announce that they will voluntarily stop the production of medicated feed in 2011. The alternatives for medicated feed are for example water or milk medication or the use of top-dressings at the farm. The consequences and possible new risks of carry-over at the farm are not completely clear yet.