We investigate whether Islamic banks with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to Islamic banks with weaker governance and whether Shariah governance can affect the credit ratings of Islamic banks or not. We document, after controlling for Islamic bank-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders, CEO power, the supervisory role of the Shariah board and investment deposits; and positively associated with share listing ownership, board independence, women directors, board directors expertise and Shariah board expertise. As well as, credit rating is higher for Southeast Asian Islamic banks and weaker for GCC Islamic banks.

This paper examines and compares the relationship between risk disclosure and corporate attributes in Islamic and conventional banks. Using a comprehensive risk disclosure index covering nine dimensions, we analyse the level of risk‐related disclosure (RRD) in a sample of 72 Islamic banks and 97 conventional banks across 11 countries. The RRD index shows that Islamic banks disclose less information about risk comparing to conventional banks. Listed banks, larger banks and aged bank disclose more information about risk than the others. Block holders, foreign ownership and board size affect negatively risk disclosure. However, board independence and the percentage of foreign directors in the board affect positively risk disclosure. Moreover, banks with higher Tier 1 ratio disclose less information about risk. Our results encourages regulators to improve corporate governance mechanisms in their banking systems through the optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership) and the board's composition in order to promote higher level of transparency and RRD.

Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management practice for a sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) using a new model of earnings management. Design/methodology/approach First, the authors estimate discretionary accruals based on loan loss provisions discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) using the procedure derived from Jones’ (1991) original model. Second, the authors run a multivariate regression model to check the linkage between corporate governance characteristics and discretionary loan loss provision. Finally, the authors use an additional sensitivity check analysis to assess whether the results are robust to the estimation procedure and to other exogenous factors. Findings Using as sample of 26 IBs pertaining to the GCC region with a total of 223 firm-year observations and a nine-year period (2004-2012), the results are conclusive and show that first, IBs with large Shariah Board size manage less DLLP. Secondly, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions membership positively impacts earnings management through DLLP in IBs. Third, there is a negative relationship between boards of director’s independence the extent to which IBs manage DLLP. Fourth, the existence of block holders positively affects earnings management by IBs. Fifth, there is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and DLLP. Finally, institutional ownership and bank size have no effect on earnings management through DLLPs. Research limitations/implications In this research, the authors do not take into account all governance factors that are supposed to impact earnings management in IBs. Future research should explore the impact of additional IBs governance structures including chief executive officer bonus, experience, gender and the extent to which IBs use real earnings management with Murabaha, Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions. Practical implications The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in helping the future development of corporate governance of IBs. In addition, the findings could prove to be useful for regulators because they are responsible for the acceptable level of corporate governance standards. Thus, they must consider strengthening governance mechanisms either through new legislation or stronger enforcement where earnings management is of such magnitude to that serious impedes information transparency and financial reporting quality of IBs. Originality/value This study associates the corporate governance characteristics with earnings management by IBs. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management and corporate governance in IBs. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of IBs’ accounting information in GCC countries.

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to review the different steps of development of Shariah governance system and to discuss the different practices of Shariah governance in Islamic financial institutions internationally. Design/methodology/approach – The paper has a particular focus on the other contributions of relevant literature and existing laws and regulations for Islamic financial institutions which provides a reflective synthesis on practical work of Shariah governance system across different jurisdictions. Findings – The main attention of this paper is Islamic financial institutions and a key issue arising is that the typical structure, functions, duties and responsibilities are different from country to country. Practical implications – The paper put forward various suggestions to the regulatory authorities and to the Islamic Financial Services Board to enhance the Shariah governance system and to standardize the different practices of Shariah governance worldwide. Originality/value – The originality and the value of the paper lie in its critical review of current Shariah governance practices worldwide. As well, some key issues pertaining to Shariah governance in Islamic financial institutions are addressed to encourage further investigation by academics and practitioners in the field.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of Islamic banks (IBs) product and services disclosure (PSD). Design/methodology/approach A computer-based content analysis is run upon the annual reports for a sample of 78 IBs operating in 11 countries from 2004 to 2012 to find the number of product and services statements. The levels and trends of PSD are identified. A regression analysis to identify the factors affecting PSD in IBs is also used. Findings The findings suggest that there has been a significant improvement of PSD over time. The results show a positive association between PSD and Shariah board size, board size, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, duality in position, blockholders and investment account holders. However, they show a negative association between PSD and institutional ownership. In addition, it appears that board independence does not affect significantly banks’ PSD. It is also found that the bank performance, bank age, leverage, listing, adoption of international financial reporting standards, adoption of Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions and country transparency index have a positive effect on the PSD. Originality/value This study offers an original contribution to corporate disclosure literature by being the first to develop and investigate PSD for a large sample of IBs during a long period of time. It links P&S with bank corporate governance characteristics. The findings have many important policy implications. More specifically, this paper encourages regulators in the studied countries to improve corporate governance mechanisms in their Islamic banking systems through the optimization of ownership structure, CEO’s characteristics and the board’s characteristics, to promote PSD. Moreover, the findings support the theoretical predictions of the generalized agency theory. This study’s empirical evidence enhances the understanding of the corporate social responsibility disclosure environment in general and the PSD environment in particular for IBs. This study is the first one that measures PSD in the annual reports for a large cross-countries sample of IBs during a long period of time. It is also the first one that links PSD with IBs corporate governance mechanisms.