Achen and Snidal's deductive theory of deterrence contributes very little to an understanding of the uses and limitations of deterrence strategy as an instrument of foreign policy. Lacking operationalization, their “rational deterrence theory” is incapable of predicting the outcome of individual cases. Furthermore, it has not yet addressed the need (i) to reconceptualize the problem of deterrence for different levels of conflict; (2) to refine the assumption of “rationality”; (3) to deal with the phenomenon of equifinality; (4) to develop a framework of strategic interaction between Initiator and Defender acknowledging that an Initiator often has multiple options for challenging the status quo from which to choose an action that meets his cost-benefit criteria; (5) to find a way of taking into account decision-making variables that, as case studies have demonstrated, often affect deterrence outcomes; and (6) to broaden the conceptualization of deterrence strategy to encompass the possible use of positive inducements as a means of discouraging challenges to a status quo situation.
No abstract
Crises a b o u n d in and around our lives. One spouse discovers the other's infidelity and threatens a divorce unless the illicit liaison is b r o k e n off immediately. A union is on the verge of declaring a strike. Congress, about to adjourn, has failed to agree on a budget, preventing the g o v e r n m e n t from paying its bills. A Third World country, unable to meet its debt payments to foreign banks, is about to be declared in default. The Soviet Union sends nuclear missiles to Cuba and the president of the United States goes on television to d e m a n d their immediate withdrawal and to announce a naval blockade of the island.In each of these cases, a negotiation may take place to try to avert an impending major loss. Times of crisis call for a special kind of negotiation. There is no time for drawn-out discussion or the usual diplomatic dance, and typically the negotiators are under considerable stress. Nowhere is the critical role of negotiation so clear as in crisis, for here it can make the difference b e t w e e n peace and war, metaphorically and sometimes literally.Richard Lebow points out that if the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 had d e v e l o p e d into a cataclysmic war, historians would have had little trouble explaining w h y this war was inevitable, arising as it did from the deepseated geopolitical and ideological conflict b e t w e e n the superpowers, the spiraling arms race, and the heightened tension of the Cold War.1 Yet this crisis did not turn into a war. Decision-makers on each side s o m e h o w succeeded jointly in preserving the peace.This paper seeks to understand the dynamics of the decision-making process in crises. What makes a crisis a crisis? What are key variables which, if manipulated in one direction, intensify the crisis, or if manipulated the other way, tend to defuse it? Where can the decision-making process fail? We do not offer here a s u m m a r y of the valuable and extensive literature which analyzes crises, but rather attempt to distill a simple conceptual f r a m e w o r k for understanding a crisis that a practitioner could use. Our immediate concern is not the question of h o w to control a crisis, but h o w one might usefully think about a crisis as a first step toward controlling it.
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