The OECD questions whether non‐state services in fragile states may delegitimise the state in the eyes of citizens, arguing that ‘state‐building’ depends on governments’ engagement in service management. This article reviews the available evidence to identify what types of engagement are feasible and most likely to contribute to service delivery, or not to damage it. It considers the capacity requirements and the risks associated with state intervention through policy formulation, regulation, contracting and mutual agreements, and concludes by identifying ways of incrementally involving the state, beginning with activities that are least likely to do harm to non‐state provision.
Politics is widely regarded as affecting and being affected by the performance of public services, yet little research differentiates between services in exploring these effects. The article addresses this gap by proposing a framework for understanding and comparing the politics of different services. It identifies how the nature of the good, type of market failure, tasks involved in delivery, and demand for a service-hitherto regarded largely as economic and managerial concerns-affect political commitment, organizational control, and user power. Policy responses can be targeted to address service characteristics where they present opportunities or constraints to better services.
Non-state provision (NSP) of basic services is an important substitute for government services in most developing countries. The international policy environment favours the idea that service levels could be improved if government and non-state providers collaborated. This article examines the experience based on studies of basic education and healthcare, water and sanitation in six African and South Asian countries. It finds that, while policy is now generally in support of NSP, practice is more often unsupportive and relationships are surrounded by mistrust. The main providers of non-state services-local entrepreneurs, individual practitioners, community organisations and small NGOs-are largely absent from any dialogue with government. They are exposed to forms of regulation that are largely repressive and effectively designed to protect established interests. Nevertheless, the article identifies positive examples of alternative forms of regulation that advance improved service standards, of facilitation by large NGOs acting in an intermediary role in support of local actors, and of replicable forms of collaboration between government and non-state providers. THE QUESTIONSThis article addresses the issue whether governments can engage with non-state providers in ways that increase and improve service provision to poor people. It seeks answers across the service sectors to three questions: What are the explanations of failed or non-supportive relationships? Under what circumstances may positive relationships occur? What are the policy implications? The article draws largely on the six country studies referred to in this Symposium's introductory article (Of the six countries covered by the research, non-state provision (NSP) of services to the poorer half of the population is important in all but South Africa. We cannot be confident about its size; one of the strongest indicators of the disengagement of governments from the non-state sector is that in none of the countries was there any systematic information on it. However, our studies were able to obtain some indication of the scale of activity in each country.In South Africa, although the non-state sector is large in terms of its turnover and employment, its population coverage is small by comparison with that of the public sector and mainly focused on the wealthy population. Half of all health expenditure is in the private for-profit sector which serves less than a fifth of the population; and only just over 3% of the population attends private schools. By contrast, in Nigeria and Malawi, Christian medical public administration and development missions provide around 60% and 37% of healthcare services, respectively, and in addition there is a myriad of for-profit providers. Faith-based organisations own the majority of schools in Malawi, although most are funded by the state and are closely integrated into the public system. In Nigeria mission schools were taken over by the state in the 1970s. Private for-profit schools are important in both countries, attend...
This article identifies the leaders, the supporters and the resisters of public service reform. It adopts a principal–agent framework, comparing reality with an ‘ideal’ situation in which citizens are the principals over political policy-makers as their agents, and policy-makers are the principals over public service officials as their agents. Reform in most developing countries is complicated by an additional set of external actors — international financial institutions and donors. In practice, international agencies and core government officials usually act as the ‘principals’ in the determination of reforms. The analysis identifies the interests involved in reform, indicating how the balance between them is affected by institutional and sectoral factors. Organizational reforms, particularly in the social sectors, present greater difficulties than first generation economic policy reforms
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