This article examines the ways in which diplomacy is adapting in the information age, to the increased pressures and opportunities that changes in information and communication technologies and capabilities provide. The interaction of technological, economic, political and social changes, such as globalisation, the development and rapid expansion of information and communication technologies, the increasing ability of citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to access and use these technologies, and the rise of transnational and co-operative security issues, are affecting the ways in which governments conduct their diplomacy. These changes are giving rise to what might be termed a 'new public diplomacy'. This can be characterised by a blurring of traditional distinctions between international and domestic information activities, between public and traditional diplomacy and between cultural diplomacy, marketing and news management. The article focuses on a comparison of Britain and Canada. It argues that, in Britain, the new public diplomacy features a repackaging of diplomacy to project a particular image to an overseas audience, which is largely treated as a passive recipient of diplomacy. However, in Canada the new public diplomacy is characterised by a more inclusive approach to diplomacy, enabling citizen groups and NGOs to play a greater role in international affairs.Diplomacy has traditionally been thought of as the development and implementation of foreign policy by diplomats (James 1993). However, states and their officials are no longer the only actors in diplomatic relations. There is an increasing opportunity for and emphasis on the role of the public in diplomacy, not only as recipients of diplomacy-the traditional understanding of 'public diplomacy' as a government's process of communicating with the public of another nation in order to influence its opinion-but also as actors in diplomacy. Put simply, the public dimension of diplomacy has been increasing in importance. Walter Wriston explains that 'there was a time when diplomats were the sole interlocutors between countries. Now, unmediated dialogue and information exchange between citizens from around the world occurs 24 hours a day' (Wriston 1997). Indeed, 'diplomats remark increasingly, even plaintively, that advanced communications and other aspects of the information revolution are altering the nature of diplomatic time and space-they are quickening the tempo of diplomacy and forcing open its once largely closed processes' (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1999, 2). As a result of this, diplomacy is undergoing a radical rethink today, with repeated calls for diplomacy to be 'reinvented' to take account of the information revolution (Fulton, Burt and Robinson 1998, x;Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1999). Under New Labour, Britain has started to rethink traditional notions of diplomatic conduct (Leonard and Alakeson 2000), and there has even been the suggestion of an end to foreign policy as we know it, with an increased role for the public in the develo...
As debate continues over the conduct, the legality and the morality of the war in Iraq, this article addresses how and why Prime Minister Blair decided on the British road to war in Iraq. The article argues that Tony Blair was working within a mindset at both the domestic and international levels that meant he was predisposed to use military force against Iraq and indeed against other perceived threats to the West. His mindset arose, we will argue, through fear rather than arrogance, through the experiences of the past two decades as much as contemporary events, and this meant that he systematically over-estimated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. We postulate that Blair was not pressured into invading Iraq by President Bush. Rather, he believed that it was the right path for Britain to take, and that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was actually the logical outcome of the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ outlined in his Chicago speech in 1999. We go on to make the claim that by concentrating on supporting the United States in its grand strategy, Tony Blair misunderstood the pattern of politics at home and perhaps more seriously of the ‘threat’ to the domestic security of the United Kingdom. This was not a danger from Iraqi WMD or even from ‘foreign’ terrorists as had happened on 9/11 but from home-grown suicide bombers, some of whom claimed to be inspired by opposition to Blair’s wars. This was the blowback that mattered – and will continue to do so – for the UK.
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