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This study examines how the appointment of former politicians and regulators to boards of directors or management teams influences corporate acquisition activity and performance. We find that bidders with political connections are more likely to acquire targets and avoid regulatory delay or denial. The merger premium paid increases with political connectedness. The announcement period returns show that investors recognize that bids by politically connected acquirers are more likely to create firm value. Connected bidders make more bids and bid on larger targets. Connected acquirers also enjoy superior post-merger financial and operating performance.

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between functional diversification and bank earnings management. We document a positive relationship between bank earnings management and bank diversification. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that diversification increases the asymmetric information of banks, leading to greater discretionary power by bank managers. This effect is most prevalent in smaller banks and non-dividend paying banks. The impact of diversification on earnings management is less pronounced during the crisis. Our study is of interest to regulators and other stakeholders who examine factors which affect behavior of bank managers. About the Authors: Viet-DungTran is affiliated with the Center for Studies and Applied Research in Management (CERAG) and Université Grenoble Alpes. He pursues research on the capital structure of Vietnamese banks. M.

We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.

Earnings management can be either opportunistic, adding noise to reported earnings, or informative about a firm's underlying economic performance, adding valuable information to financial reports. This study examines earnings management in banks with differing levels of information asymmetry. Specifically, we compare earnings management between public and private banks by using discretionary loan-loss provisions (DLLPs) as proxies. Employing a large dataset of US public and private banks from 1986:Q1 to 2013:Q4, this study provides evidence of stronger earnings management behavior in public banks versus private banks. The evidence remains robust under a battery of sensitivity tests. Since incentives for earnings management are more relevant within a specific context, we identify the conditions that motivate different earnings management incentives, which allows us to better observe specific managerial motives. Greater DLLPs observed in public banks are utilized to send private information to investors, consistent with the signaling hypothesis. We also find evidence that capital requirements alter DLLPs, consistent with the capital management hypothesis. Banks with relatively low (high) earnings tend to decrease (increase) their earnings through manipulation of DLLPs, inconsistent with our income-smoothing hypothesis. The study extends to current debates on earnings management between public and private firms, and also provides a better understanding of the determinants of earnings management. About the Authors: Viet-Dung Tran is affiliated with the Center for Studies and Applied Research in Management (CERAG) and Université Grenoble Alpes. He pursues research on the capital structure of AbstractEarnings management can be either opportunistic, adding noise to reported earnings, or informative about a firm's underlying economic performance, adding valuable information to financial reports. This study examines earnings management in banks with differing levels of information asymmetry. Specifically, we compare earnings management between public and private banks by using discretionary loan-loss provisions (DLLPs) as proxies. Employing a large dataset of US public and private banks from 1986:Q1 to 2013:Q4, this study provides evidence of stronger earnings management behavior in public banks versus private banks. The evidence remains robust under a battery of sensitivity tests. Since incentives for earnings management are more relevant within a specific context, we identify the conditions that motivate different earnings management incentives, which allows us to better observe specific managerial motives. Greater DLLPs observed in public banks are utilized to send private information to investors, consistent with the signaling hypothesis. We also find evidence that capital requirements alter DLLPs, consistent with the capital management hypothesis. Banks with relatively low (high) earnings tend to decrease (increase) their earnings through manipulation of DLLPs, inconsistent with our income-smoothing hypothesis. The s...

No abstract

Earnings management can be either opportunistic, adding noise to reported earnings, or informative about a firm's underlying economic performance, adding valuable information to financial reports. This study examines earnings management in banks with differing levels of information asymmetry. Specifically, we compare earnings management between public and private banks by using discretionary loan-loss provisions (DLLPs) as proxies. Employing a large dataset of US public and private banks from 1986:Q1 to 2013:Q4, this study provides evidence of stronger earnings management behavior in public banks versus private banks. The evidence remains robust under a battery of sensitivity tests. Since incentives for earnings management are more relevant within a specific context, we identify the conditions that motivate different earnings management incentives, which allows us to better observe specific managerial motives. Greater DLLPs observed in public banks are utilized to send private information to investors, consistent with the signaling hypothesis. We also find evidence that capital requirements alter DLLPs, consistent with the capital management hypothesis. Banks with relatively low (high) earnings tend to decrease (increase) their earnings through manipulation of DLLPs, inconsistent with our income-smoothing hypothesis. The study extends to current debates on earnings management between public and private firms, and also provides a better understanding of the determinants of earnings management.

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