Taking as our focus the city of London over the last decade, we use state-held records of house sales to consider the impact of competition for housing resources in the luxury property market. This data suggests that the use of offshore investment vehicles and the concealment of wealth from national tax agencies have become key mechanisms by which housing resources have been exploited by the wealthy and their capital deployed by agents of the rich. Using the concept of wealth chains, we consider these methods of capital accumulation as these extending flows of managed capital become ‘anchored’ within specific urban spaces, in this case the luxury housing market of inner West London. Our analysis of a selection of these chains shows that the prevailing political management of the property economy benefits those already winning the war of inequality while looking to augment their capital and shield it from tax and regulation. The ultra-wealthy, financial intermediaries and multinational corporations have created chains articulated across space, with the effect of undermining the value of dwellings as homes, and have replaced them with assets to be traded in pursuit of private and offshore wealth gains. The result is an urban context that favours already advantaged and powerful interests and enables the avoidance of tax obligations desperately needed at a time of austerity and intense housing need.

This is a theoretical article exploring the relationship between financial fragility, derivative trading, and financial crisis. It synthesizes the work of Hyman Minsky (1977, 1985), Jan Toporowski (2001), and Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty (2006). The decade immediately after 1971 is presented as a key period with key events that shaped a Wall Street revolution that now drives world capitalism. Balance sheet computations of expected profitability emerge as the main driver of a contemporary capitalism that is inherently more competitive than before. Debt, credit, and liquidity, therefore, play crucial parts in a world system where banks and corporations have been joined by new rentier institutions in riskier speculative business activities that now characterize the system. The conclusions are largely Keynesian ". . . when the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." JEL classifications: G12, P1

The UK, particularly London, is a global hub for money laundering, a significant portion of which takes place through residential property. However, understanding the distribution and characteristics of offshore residential property in the UK is a challenge. This paper attempts to remedy that situation by enhancing a publicly available dataset of UK property owned by offshore companies. We create a data-processing pipeline which draws on several datasets and on machine learning techniques to create a parsed set of addresses classified into six use classes. The enhanced dataset contains 138,000 properties – 44,000 more than the original dataset. The majority are residential (95k), with a disproportionate number of those in London (42k). The average offshore residential property in London is worth 1.33 million GBP, and collectively this amounts to approximately 56 billion GBP. We perform an in-depth analysis of offshore residential property in London, comparing the price, distribution and entropy/concentration with Airbnb property, low-use/empty property and conventional residential property. We estimate that the total number of offshore, low-use and Airbnb properties in London is between 144,000 and 164,000, collectively worth between 145–174 billion GBP. Furthermore, offshore residential property is more expensive and has higher entropy/concentration than all other property types. In addition, we identify two different types of offshore property – nested and individual – which have different price and distribution characteristics. Finally, we release the enhanced offshore property dataset, the complete low-use London dataset and the pipeline for creating the enhanced dataset to encourage further research into this topic.

This paper focuses on the subject of monetary transmission in Africa. It begins with a report on the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 in Africa. In the countries with more developed financial systems the financial channel proved to be the most important in transmitting the crisis. In the more peripheral countries the trade channel proved to be the most important.Where countries were able to withstand the global shock coming from the financial crisis they did so with a diversified group of trading partners in fast growing economies. The paper then turns to examine three post crisis institutional developments and asks, how are: a) an increased momentum towards regional integration, b) the rise of Pan African banking and, c) an increase in cross border flows, affecting the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) in Africa. It is clear from the literature that the rise of Pan African banking and the regionalization thrust of the authorities are deepening the financial channels between countries. But with respect to cross border flows, the huge size of deposits maintained by Africa's BIS reporting banks suggest relatively low levels of bank intermediation and competition. Thus the benefits that are assumed to accrue as a result of increased cross border flows are withdrawn from the local economy and stored up in the BIS banks. We know large deposits reflect the expectations of the deposit holders. But beyond that very little is known about the role of expectations and the workings of the expectations channel in monetary transmission in Africa. Even less is known about how such expectations would interact with those formed as a result of operations in the large informal sectors which characterise African macro economies. Until research can bridge this gap, the increasing cross border flows with the large deposits held in BIS banks form the basis yet another explanation for the historical weakness of the MTM in Africa.