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In October 2017, most European countries reported unique atmospheric detections of aerosol-bound radioruthenium (106Ru). The range of concentrations varied from some tenths of µBq·m−3 to more than 150 mBq·m−3. The widespread detection at such considerable (yet innocuous) levels suggested a considerable release. To compare activity reports of airborne 106Ru with different sampling periods, concentrations were reconstructed based on the most probable plume presence duration at each location. Based on airborne concentration spreading and chemical considerations, it is possible to assume that the release occurred in the Southern Urals region (Russian Federation). The 106Ru age was estimated to be about 2 years. It exhibited highly soluble and less soluble fractions in aqueous media, high radiopurity (lack of concomitant radionuclides), and volatility between 700 and 1,000 °C, thus suggesting a release at an advanced stage in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The amount and isotopic characteristics of the radioruthenium release may indicate a context with the production of a large 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment.

The Cosmic-Ray Extremely Distributed Observatory (CREDO) is a newly formed, global collaboration dedicated to observing and studying cosmic rays (CR) and cosmic-ray ensembles (CRE): groups of at least two CR with a common primary interaction vertex or the same parent particle. The CREDO program embraces testing known CR and CRE scenarios, and preparing to observe unexpected physics, it is also suitable for multi-messenger and multi-mission applications. Perfectly matched to CREDO capabilities, CRE could be formed both within classical models (e.g., as products of photon–photon interactions), and exotic scenarios (e.g., as results of decay of Super-Heavy Dark Matter particles). Their fronts might be significantly extended in space and time, and they might include cosmic rays of energies spanning the whole cosmic-ray energy spectrum, with a footprint composed of at least two extensive air showers with correlated arrival directions and arrival times. As the CRE are predominantly expected to be spread over large areas and, due to the expected wide energy range of the contributing particles, such a CRE detection might only be feasible when using all available cosmic-ray infrastructure collectively, i.e., as a globally extended network of detectors. Thus, with this review article, the CREDO Collaboration invites the astroparticle physics community to actively join or to contribute to the research dedicated to CRE and, in particular, to pool together cosmic-ray data to support specific CRE detection strategies.

Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 μBq m except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related toI use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network.

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From early April 2020, wildfires raged in the highly contaminated areas around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (CNPP), Ukraine. For about 4 weeks, the fires spread around and into the Chernobyl exclusion zone (CEZ) and came within a few kilometers of both the CNPP and radioactive waste storage facilities. Wildfires occurred on several occasions throughout the month of April. They were extinguished, but weather conditions and the spread of fires by airborne embers and smoldering fires led to new fires starting at different locations of the CEZ. The forest fires were only completely under control at the beginning of May, thanks to the tireless and incessant work of the firefighters and a period of sustained precipitation. In total, 0.7−1.2 TBq 137 Cs were released into the atmosphere. Smoke plumes partly spread south and west and contributed to the detection of airborne 137 Cs over the Ukrainian territory and as far away as Western Europe. The increase in airborne 137 Cs ranged from several hundred μBq•m −3 in northern Ukraine to trace levels of a few μBq•m −3 or even within the usual background level in other European countries. Dispersion modeling determined the plume arrival time and was helpful in the assessment of the possible increase in airborne 137 Cs concentrations in Europe. Detections of airborne 90 Sr (emission estimate 345−612 GBq) and Pu (up to 75 GBq, mostly 241 Pu) were reported from the CEZ. Americium-241 represented only 1.4% of the total source term corresponding to the studied anthropogenic radionuclides but would have contributed up to 80% of the inhalation dose.

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