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Cultural factors, as measured by the two dimensions of values identified by Inglehart, explain 75% of the variation in the Perceived Corruption Index across non-communist countries. A strong 'survival' orientation contributes twice as much as a strong 'traditional' orientation to higher levels of corruption. When controlling for these cultural variables, communism and post-communism increase the levels of corruption even further, both directly and by contributing to heavier emphasis on survival values. Communism created structural incentives for engaging in corrupt behaviors, which became such a widespread fact of life that they became rooted in the culture in these societies Á/ that is, the social norms and practices prevailing in communist societies. The transitions toward democracy and market economies have not yet erased this culture of corruption. In addition, the process of privatization itself has opened myriad opportunities for corruption. The effects are manifest in comparisons of corruption in non-communist and (post-)communist countries in five cultural zones.

A B S T R A C TMeasures of electoral system disproportionality and of party system volatility (as well as malapportionment and vote splitting) present similar statistical issues in terms of deciding what index is most appropriate, but it is not common to view indices of disproportionality and volatility as serving similar ends. Making use of 12 different criteria, we evaluate 19 indices that have been previously proposed as measures of either disproportionality of electoral seats-votes results or over-time volatility of party vote (or seat) shares. We suggest that, on balance, Gallagher's (1991) index, which has achieved increasing acceptance in the seats-votes literature on disproportionality (see esp. Lijphart, 1994) offers the most desirable combination of features, although the advantages it offers over the Loosemore-Hanby index are not large and are debatable. We also find that Dalton's principle of transfers presents an ambiguity when one party has a larger number of excess seats, while another has a larger proportion of them.KEY WORDS Ⅲ Dalton's principle of transfers Ⅲ malapportionment Ⅲ proportionality Ⅲ volatility of party shares Ⅲ vote splitting The Objective: Mapping the Measures of DiscordanceDeviation from proportional representation (PR) means the difference in party vote shares and party seat shares in some given election (v i versus s i ). Volatility of votes means the difference in party vote shares (v i ) from one election to another (v it versus v it' ); similarly, volatility of seats means the difference in party seat shares (s i ) from one election to another (s it versus s it' ). How do we best measure the proportionality/disproportionality of the translation of party vote shares into party seat shares in a given election?

The mechanical effect of electoral systems, identified by Maurice Duverger, can be estimated by means of a quantitative model. The model predicts the range within which the effective number of parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude (number of seats) of the district. At the national level, a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly. The institutional variables considered—magnitude and assembly size—define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country's politics must take place. The model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions.

Lijphart's (1999) analysis maps countries along two dimensions of democratic institutions: ‘executives-parties’ or ‘joint-power’, and ‘federal-unitary’ or ‘divided-power’. My ‘meta-study’ maps the methodology of Lijphart's mapping: the nature of indices (inputs or outputs), their logical interconnections, their susceptibility to institutional design (‘constitutional engineering’), and their suitability for expressing the intended underlying concepts. Strikingly, the joint-power indicators are highly correlated and mostly logically connected output measures, which are not susceptible to institutional design, while the opposite is true for the divided-power dimension. For this dimension most indices are expert estimates of inputs, marginally correlated, yet subject to institutional design, limited by size dependence. Surprisingly, the parliamentary-presidential aspect of institutional design does not affect the picture. The connection between cabinet life and the number of parties is even stronger than found by Lijphart. Interest groups and central bank independence fit his dimensions empirically but less so logically. In sum, institutional design may be more difficult than sometimes assumed, but offers hope.