Cognitive abilities likely evolved in response to specific environmental and social challenges and are therefore expected to be specialized for the life history of each species. Specialized cognitive abilities may be most readily engaged under conditions that approximate the natural environment of the species being studied. While naturalistic environments might therefore have advantages over laboratory settings for cognitive research, it is difficult to conduct certain types of cognitive tests in these settings. We implemented methods for automated cognitive testing of monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in large social groups (Field station) and compared the performance to that of laboratory housed monkeys (Laboratory). The Field station animals shared access to four touch screen computers in a large naturalistic social group. Each Field station subject had an RFID chip implanted in each arm for computerized identification and individualized assignment of cognitive tests. The Laboratory group was housed and tested in a typical laboratory setting, with individual access to testing computers in their home cages. Monkeys in both groups voluntarily participated at their own pace for food rewards. We evaluated performance in two visual psychophysics tests, a perceptual classification test, a transitive inference test, and a delayed matching to sample memory test. Despite differences in housing, social environment, age, and sex, monkeys in the two groups performed similarly in all tests. Semi-free ranging monkeys living in complex social environments are therefore viable subjects for cognitive testing designed to take advantage of the unique affordances of naturalistic testing environments.

If Ben is taller than Emily and Emily is taller than Dina, one can accurately infer that Ben is taller than Dina. This process of inferring relations between stimuli based on shared relations with other stimuli is called transitive inference (TI). Many species solve TI tasks in which they learn pairs of overlapping stimulus discriminations (A+B−, B+C−, etc.) and are tested with non-adjacent novel test pairings (e.g. BD). When relations between stimuli are determined by reinforcement (i.e., A is reinforced when paired with B, B when paired with C), performance can be controlled by the associative values of individual stimuli or by logical inference. In Experiment 1 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) chose the higher ranked item on non-adjacent test trials after training on a 7-image TI task. In Experiment 2 we measured the associative values of 7 TI images and found that these values did not correlate with choice in TI tests. In Experiment 3 large experimental manipulations of the associative value of images did influence performance in some TI test pairings, but performance on other pairs was consistent with the implied order. In Experiment 4 monkeys linked two previously learned 7-item lists into one 14 item list after training with a single linking pair. Linking cannot be explained by associative values. Associative value can control choice in TI tests in at least some extreme circumstances. Implied order better explains most TI choices in monkeys, and is a more viable mechanism for TI in social dominance hierarchies, which has been observed in birds and fish.

It is surprising that there are inconsistent findings of transitive inference (TI) in young infants given that non-linguistic species succeed on TI tests. To conclusively test for TI in infants, we developed a task within the social domain, with which infants are known to show sophistication. We familiarized 10- to 13-month-olds (M = 11.53 months) to a video of two dominance interactions between three puppets (bear > elephant; hippo > bear) consistent with a dominance hierarchy (hippo > bear > elephant; where '>' denotes greater dominance). Infants then viewed interactions between the two puppets that had not interacted during familiarization. These interactions were either congruent (hippo > elephant) or incongruent (elephant > hippo) with the inferred hierarchy. Consistent with TI, infants looked longer to incongruent than congruent displays. Control conditions ruled out the possibility that infants' expectations were based on stable behaviors specific to individual puppets rather than their inferred transitive dominance relations. We suggest that TI may be supported by phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of ordinal representation and visuospatial processing that come online early in human development.

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