Purpose The purpose of this paper is to understand why some Senators choose to use Twitter more frequently than others. Building on past research, which explored causal factors leading to early congressional adoption, theories about why some Senators use Twitter more frequently in their daily communications strategies are developed. Design/methodology/approach A “power user” score was developed by evaluating each Senator’s clout, interactivity, and originality on Twitter. These scores are then used as the dependent variable in a regression model to evaluate which factors influence Senators becoming Twitter “power users.” Findings The study found that: constituent income is positively correlated with heavy use, but constituent education level is not; the more ideological a Senator is the more he or she will be a Twitter power user; the number of days on Twitter is a significant indicator of advanced Twitter usage; and having staff dedicated to social media is positively correlated with being a Twitter power user. Research limitations/implications All Senators in the second session of the 113th Congress (2014) were evaluated. As such, future research hope to expand the data set to additional Senators or the House of Representatives. Practical implications A better understanding of why some Senators use Twitter more than others allows insight into constituent communications strategies and the potential implications of real-time communication on representation, and the role of accountability between a Senator and his or her constituents. Originality/value The study examines constituent communication by Senators in a new, more interactive medium than previously considered. Additionally, the study places findings about Senator’s constituent communication in the broader context of representation.

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There are two significant omissions in the literature on presidential unilateralism. First, few scholars have examined whether their theories apply to directives other than executive orders. Second, scholars have primarily focused on unilateral usage in the modern era at the expense of the traditional era. This article addresses these omissions by testing one theory, Howell’s Unilateral Politics Model, on the usage of more than 1,300 significant executive orders and proclamations from 1861 to 1944. The results show that presidents in the traditional era issued more executive orders during a partisan administration change and that this effect continued into the modern era. Traditional presidents also issued more proclamations when Congress was stronger, which is counter to what Howell expected in his theory. Ultimately, these results show that the traditional–modern presidency dichotomy applies for proclamations but not for executive orders. The modern patterns of executive order usage are a continuation of the patterns that began in the traditional era. However, a noticeable shift in behavior occurred between eras with respect to presidential proclamations, probably as a result of this type of directive evolving from an administrative tool to a more unilateral order.

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