Between 1985 and April 1991, Iraq developed anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin for biological warfare; 200 bombs and 25 ballistic missiles laden with biological agents were deployed by the time Operation Desert Storm occurred. Although cause for concern, if used during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's biological warfare arsenal probably would have been militarily ineffective for 3 reasons: (1) it was small; (2) payload dispersal mechanisms were inefficient; and (3) coalition forces dominated the theater of war (ie, they had overwhelming air superiority and had crippled Iraq's command and control capability). Despite the Gulf War defeat, the Iraqi biological warfare threat has not been extinguished. Saddam Hussein remains in power, and his desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction continues unabated. In this context, the international community must be firm in its enforcement of United Nations resolutions designed to deter Iraq from reacquiring biological warfare capability and must take steps to develop a multidisciplinary approach to limiting future development of weapons of mass destruction.
The USSR possessed a unique national public health system that included an agency named "anti-plague system." Its mission was to protect the country from highly dangerous diseases of either natural or laboratory etiology. During the 1960s, the anti-plague system became the lead agency of a program to defend against biological warfare, codenamed Project 5. This responsibility grew and by the middle 1970s came to include undertaking tasks for the offensive biological warfare program, codenamed Ferment. This article describes the anti-plague system's activities relevant to both aspects of the Soviet Union's biological warfare program, offense and defense, and analyzes its contributions to each.
In November 2001, the Monterey Institute of International Studies convened a workshop on bioterrorism threat assessment and risk management. Risk assessment practitioners from various disciplines, but without specialized knowledge of terrorism, were brought together with security and intelligence threat analysts to stimulate an exchange that could be useful to both communities. This article, prepared by a subset of the participants, comments on the workshop's findings and their implications and makes three recommendations, two short term (use of threat assessment methodologies and vulnerability analysis) and one long term (application of quantitative risk assessment and modeling), regarding the practical application of risk assessment methods to bioterrorism issues.
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