Chinese scholars are debating whether, and how, to innovate a Chinese theory of International Relations (IR). This article examines the driving forces behind this theoretical debate. It challenges the commonsensical link between external events in the subject matter (i.r.) and theorizing (IR), which suggests that the innovation of a Chinese IR theory is a natural product of China's geopolitical rise, its growing political ambitions, and discontent with Western hegemony. We propose instead a sociological approach to intellectual innovation which opens the black box of knowledge production, and argue that theoretical innovation, in China and elsewhere, is best understood as an interplay between internal and external layers. The internal academic context comprises intellectuals pursuing prominence, with each intellectual trying to carve out a maximally distinct position in order to receive attention from their peerstheorizing a Chinese IR theory being one important way of doing this. The external layer-which ranges from power politics to sociopolitical developments-affects this process indirectly by providing more research funds and autonomy to the more immediate institutional environment where control over rewards such as research funds, promotion, and publications affects what kind of work is done, with theorizing being increasingly rewarded.The International Relations discipline (IR) has long been known as an "American social science," dominated by US scholars, theories, and methodologies (Hoffmann 1977;Waever 1998;Smith 2000). A recent study of IR communities around the world shows that this has changed little, with the possible exception of China (Tickner and Waever 2009:336). Reading through the literature on IR in China, one is struck by references to debates about developing "IR with . The Chinese attempt to produce a distinctly national international theory is a unique case, and the puzzle of this paper is "Why has there been an innovational drive to develop Chinese IR theory?" Our main argument is that theoretical innovation should be understood 1 We would like to thank Ole Waever for his valuable comments on several drafts and all the Chinese scholars who agreed to participate in the interviews. We also thank Daniel Bell, Henrik Breitenbauch, Geir Helgesen, Chung-In Moon, Rens van Munster, Casper Sylvest, Morten Valbjørn, and the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. Lastly, we are grateful to the Augustinus Foundation for providing the funds that made our field trip possible. The usual disclaimer applies.

This article maps the emergence and development of Chinese discourses about China’s rise in international politics. It examines how the production of knowledge, particularly theories on international relations and grand strategy, develop in their travels between the scienti c and political as well as the international and national. Taking its point of departure in the sociology of science, the article sets out to understand the interplay between social, political, and intellectual conditions for knowledge production in today’s Interna- tional Relations (IR) research in China. Contrary to the conventional notion that Chinese social science is determined by political preferences, the paper argues 1) that the ideal of (pure) science and (dirty) politics as two separate spheres is di cult to sustain in the empirical analysis of knowledge production (in China and elsewhere) and 2) that more often than not important policy ideas and theories, such ‘Peaceful Rise’, the ‘Chinese School’ or ‘Harmonious World’ have emerged from a productive relationship between science and politics. e analysis of Chinese IR discourse shows that Chinese scholars and experts might play a more in uential role in the formulation of foreign policy concepts than usually assumed.