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Quantitative changes may be conveyed to consumers using small units (e.g., change in delivery time from 7 to 21 days) or large units (1–3 weeks). Numerosity research suggests that changes are magnified by small (vs. large) units because a change from 7 to 21 (vs. 1–3) seems larger. We introduce a reverse effect that we term unitosity: changes are magnified by large (vs. small) units because a change of weeks (vs. days) seems larger. We show that numerosity reverses to unitosity when relative salience shifts from numbers to units (study 1). Then, arguing that numbers (units) represent a low-level (high-level) construal of quantities, we show this reversal when mind-set shifts from concrete to abstract (studies 2–4). These results emerge for several quantities—height of buildings, time of maturity of financial instruments, weight of nutrients, and length of tables—and have significant implications for theory and practice.

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Loyalty programs offer rewards via mediums of different magnitudes (e.g., “$6 off when you accumulate 1,000 [100] points. Earn 10 [1] points/dollar”). The program medium presents two key pieces of information: reward distance (points required to redeem reward) and step size (points earned per dollar). In higher-magnitude (vs. lower-magnitude) programs, both reward distances (1,000 vs. 100) and step sizes (10 vs. 1 point[s]/dollar) are larger. How do these two pieces of information affect consumers' postenrollment inferences of progress, store loyalty, and recommendation likelihood? Do consumers always integrate both pieces? We identify a moderator, step-size ambiguity, and show that when ambiguity is high, only reward distance affects inferences. When ambiguity is lower, consumers integrate step size with reward distance, but in a biased manner. Implications arise in goal following and in physical and psychological distance estimation contexts (e.g., weight loss, savings) where distances and step sizes can vary (e.g., as a function of units: kilograms vs. pounds), but especially in loyalty rewards contexts.

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Consumer behavior is often influenced by subtle environmental cues, such as temperature, color, lighting, scent, or sound. We explore the effects of a not-so-subtle cue—human crowding—on calorie consumption. Although crowding is an omnipresent factor, it has received little attention in the marketing literature. We present six studies showing that crowding increases calorie consumption. These effects occur because crowding increases distraction, which hampers cognitive thinking and evokes more affective processing. When consumers process information affectively, they consume more calories. We show the specific reason for the increase in calories. When given a choice between several different options, people select and eat higher-calorie items, but when presented with only one option, people eat more of the same food item. We document this process, rule out alternative explanations, and discuss theoretical and managerial implications.

We show that providing a low (vs. no) price discount can lower purchase propensity of low-priced products under certain conditions—when purchases are nonessential and purchase volume is small. Based on the theory of purchase value (Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan 1998; Thaler 1983), we argue that offering a low price discount for nonessential purchases decreases perceived transaction value that in turn lowers consumers’ purchase propensity. However, this boomerang effect reverses when purchase volume is larger or when the purchase is essential. We demonstrate this effect with secondary scanner panel data sets (with six different product categories) and in five laboratory experiments (with real purchases). We also document the process and delineate boundary conditions.

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