Laboratory researchers in economics assiduously protect the confidentiality of subjects. Why? Presumably because they fear that the social consequences of identifying subjects and their choices would significantly alter the economic incentives of the game. But these may be the same social effects that institutions, like charitable fund-raising, are manipulating to help overcome free riding and to promote economic efficiency. We present an experiment that unmasks subjects in a systematic and controlled way. We show that, as intuition suggests, identifying subjects has significant effects. Surprisingly, we found that two supplemental conditions meant to mimic common fund-raising practices actually had the most dramatic influences on behavior. D

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The existence of a beauty premium in the labor market and the malefemale wage gap suggests that appearance can matter in the real world. We explore beauty and gender in a public goods experiment and find similar effects. We find a beauty premium, even though beautiful people contribute, on average, no more or less than others. The beauty premium, however, disappears when we provide information on individual contributions, and becomes a beauty penalty. Players seem to expect beautiful people to be more cooperative. Relative to these expectations, they appear more selfish, which in turn results in less cooperation by others. These appear to be clear examples of stereotyping. We also find a substantial benefit to being male, especially with information. This is primarily due to men being better "leaders." Men tend to make large contributions, and people follow their example and give more in later rounds. * We are grateful to

This article investigates the economic efficiency of farm households, with an application to The Gambia. The efficiency analysis is conducted not at the farm level but at the household level, thus capturing the importance of off-farm activities. Output-based measures of technical, allocative, and scale efficiency are generated using nonparametric measurements. An econometric analysis of factors affecting the efficiency indexes is then conducted using a Tobit model. Technical efficiency is fairly high indicating that access to technology is not a severe constraint for most farm households. The cost of scale inefficiency is modest. Allocative inefficiency by contrast is found to be important for the majority of farm households. On the basis of the Tobit results, imperfections in markets for financial capital and nonfarm employment contribute to significant allocative inefficiency. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

People pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many types of decisions. We ask, is there informational value in a face in a situation where trust and reciprocity can increase earnings? We use a laboratory trust game experiment where subjects are unable to observe a counterpart, must observe a counterpart, or can pay to reveal a counterpart's photograph. Both senders and responders are willing to pay to observe the photos, and we show that behavior, earnings, and efficiency are affected. When subjects are "face to face," efficiency is enhanced, and senders have higher earnings. (JEL D12, D83, Z13)

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Risk preferences, Inconsistent choices, Financial decisions, Experiments, C91, D81,