Author guidelines for journals could help to promote transparency, openness, and reproducibility

This paper reports on the first randomized evaluation of the impact of introducing the standard microcredit group-based lending product in a new market. In 2005, half of 104 slums in Hyderabad, India were randomly selected for opening of a branch of a particular microfinance institution (Spandana) while the remainder were not, although other MFIs were free to enter those slums. Fifteen to 18 months after Spandana began lending in treated areas, households were 8.8 percentage points more likely to have a microcredit loan. They were no more likely to start any new business, although they were more likely to start several at once, and they invested more in their existing businesses. There was no effect on average monthly expenditure per capita. Expenditure on durable goods increased in treated areas, while expenditures on "temptation goods" declined. Three to four years after the initial expansion (after many of the control slums had started getting credit from Spandana and other MFIs ), the probability of borrowing from an MFI in treatment and comparison slums was the same, but on average households in treatment slums had been borrowing for longer and in larger amounts. Consumption was still no different in treatment areas, and the average business was still no more profitable, although we find an increase in profits at the top end. We found no changes in any of the development outcomes that are often believed to be affected by microfinance, including health, education, and women's empowerment. The results of this study are largely consistent with those of four other evaluations of similar programs in different contexts. JEL codes: O16, G21, D21 * This paper updates and supersedes the 2010 version, which reported results using one wave of endline surveys. The authors wish to extend thanks to Spandana, especially Padmaja Reddy whose commitment to understanding the impact of microfinance made this project possible, and to numerous seminar audiences and colleagues for insightful suggestions. The Centre for

This paper is a practical guide (a toolkit)

This paper reports on the first randomized evaluation of the impact of introducing the standard microcredit group-based lending product in a new market. In 2005, half of 104 slums in Hyderabad, India were randomly selected for opening of a branch of a particular microfinance institution (Spandana) while the remainder were not, although other MFIs were free to enter those slums. Fifteen to 18 months after Spandana began lending in treated areas, households were 8.8 percentage points more likely to have a microcredit loan. They were no more likely to start any new business, although they were more likely to start several at once, and they invested more in their existing businesses. There was no effect on average monthly expenditure per capita. Expenditure on durable goods increased in treated areas, while expenditures on "temptation goods" declined. Three to four years after the initial expansion (after many of the control slums had started getting credit from Spandana and other MFIs ), the probability of borrowing from an MFI in treatment and comparison slums was the same, but on average households in treatment slums had been borrowing for longer and in larger amounts. Consumption was still no different in treatment areas, and the average business was still no more profitable, although we find an increase in profits at the top end. We found no changes in any of the development outcomes that are often believed to be affected by microfinance, including health, education, and women's empowerment. The results of this study are largely consistent with those of four other evaluations of similar programs in different contexts. JEL codes: O16, G21, D21 * This paper updates and supersedes the 2010 version, which reported results using one wave of endline surveys. The authors wish to extend thanks to Spandana, especially Padmaja Reddy whose commitment to understanding the impact of microfinance made this project possible, and to numerous seminar audiences and colleagues for insightful suggestions. The Centre for

Objective To assess the efficacy of modest non-financial incentives on immunisation rates in children aged 1-3 and to compare it with the effect of only improving the reliability of the supply of services. Design Clustered randomised controlled study. Setting Rural Rajasthan, India. Participants 1640 children aged 1-3 at end point. Interventions 134 villages were randomised to one of three groups: a once monthly reliable immunisation camp (intervention A; 379 children from 30 villages); a once monthly reliable immunisation camp with small incentives (raw lentils and metal plates for completed immunisation; intervention B; 382 children from 30 villages), or control (no intervention, 860 children in 74 villages). Surveys were undertaken in randomly selected households at baseline and about 18 months after the interventions started (end point).Main outcome measures Proportion of children aged 1-3 at the end point who were partially or fully immunised. Results Among children aged 1-3 in the end point survey, rates of full immunisation were 39% (148/382, 95% confidence interval 30% to 47%) for intervention B villages (reliable immunisation with incentives), 18% (68/379, 11% to 23%) for intervention A villages (reliable immunisation without incentives), and 6% (50/860, 3% to 9%) for control villages. The relative risk of complete immunisation for intervention B versus control was 6.7 (4.5 to 8.8) and for intervention B versus intervention A was 2.2 (1.5 to 2.8). Children in areas neighbouring intervention B villages were also more likely to be fully immunised than those from areas neighbouring intervention A villages (1.9, 1.1 to 2.8). The average cost per immunisation was $28 (1102 rupees, about £16 or €19) in intervention A and $56 (2202 rupees) in intervention B. Conclusions Improving reliability of services improves immunisation rates, but the effect remains modest. Small incentives have large positive impacts on the uptake of immunisation services in resource poor areas and are more cost effective than purely improving supply. Trial registration IRSCTN87759937.

Social scientists should adopt higher transparency standards to improve the quality and credibility of research.

Despite their importance, there is limited evidence on how institutions can be strengthened. Evaluating the effects of specific reforms is complicated by the lack of exogenous variation in institutions, the difficulty of measuring institutional performance, and the temptation to “cherry pick” estimates from among the large number of indicators required to capture this multifaceted subject. We evaluate one attempt to make local institutions more democratic and egalitarian by imposing participation requirements for marginalized groups (including women) and test for learning-by-doing effects. We exploit the random assignment of a governance program in Sierra Leone, develop innovative real-world outcome measures, and use a preanalysis plan (PAP) to bind our hands against data mining. The intervention studied is a “community-driven development” program, which has become a popular strategy for foreign aid donors. We find positive short-run effects on local public goods and economic outcomes, but no evidence for sustained impacts on collective action, decision making, or the involvement of marginalized groups, suggesting that the intervention did not durably reshape local institutions. We discuss the practical trade-offs faced in implementing a PAP and show how in its absence we could have generated two divergent, equally erroneous interpretations of program impacts on institutions.

Participation of beneficiaries in the monitoring of public services is increasingly seen as a key to improving their efficiency. In India, the current government flagship program on universal primary education organizes both locally elected leaders and parents of children enrolled in public schools into committees and gives these groups powers over resource allocation, and monitoring and management of school performance. However, in a baseline survey we found that people were not aware of the existence of these committees and their potential for improving education. This paper evaluates three different interventions to encourage beneficiaries' participation through these committees: providing infonnation, training community members in a new testing tool, and training and organizing volunteers to hold remedial reading camps for illiterate children. We find that these interventions had no impact on community involvement in public schools, and no impact on teacher effort or learning outcomes in those schools.However, we do find that the intervention that trained volunteers to teach children to read had a large impact on activity outside public schools -local youths volunteered to be trained to teach, and children who attended these camps substantially improved their reading skills. These results suggest that citizens face substantial constraints in participating to improve the public education system, even when they care about education and are willing to do something to improve it.