Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.
This article looks at forty-two decisions in civil pollution cases in China as a window onto judges' political logic and the accompanying implications for environmental enforcement. The starting point is a typology of judicial decision making in one-party states based on two dimensions of decisions: the degree of legal formality (e.g., how closely judges adhere to the letter of the law) and individual autonomy (e.g., judges' power to make decisions in individual cases). Mapping pollution decisions onto this typology highlights shifting judicial strategy. While Chinese judges typically comply with instructions when the political pressure is dialed up, a combination of shifting incentives, uncertainty about the law, and political ambiguity can also allow de facto discretion in low-profile, run-of-the-mill cases. Everyday cases tend to cluster under the rubric of "rough justice" in which judges weigh competing political priorities and aim for a livable compromise that dents but upholds the status quo. This sample of cases also shows judges occasionally innovating at the margins by offering new legal interpretations or validating new types of claims. Although Chinese courts remain weak tools for environmental protection, limited innovation suggests that they can help nudge along local incremental social change.
Over the past five years, Chinese courts have placed tens of millions of court judgments online. We analyze the promise and pitfalls of using this remarkable new data source, highlighting the takeaways for readers who face similar issues using other collections of legal texts. Drawing on a dataset of 1,058,986 documents from Henan province, we first document problems with missing data and call on scholars to treat variation in court disclosure rates as an urgent research question. We then outline strategies to learn from a corpus that is vast and incomplete. Using a topic model of administrative litigation in Henan, we complicate the conventional wisdom that administrative lawsuits are an extension of contentious politics that give Chinese citizens an opportunity to challenge the state. Instead, we find a high prevalence of administrative cases that reflect an underlying dispute between two private parties, suggesting that administrative lawsuits often represent an attempt to enlist help from the state resolving a civil dispute.
This article traces a civil environmental lawsuit from dispute to decision to explore how environmental law works, as well as how lawyers and litigants try to work the law. Detailing ground-level encounters with a legal system promoted and carefully watched by political elites offers a fresh perspective on the ways the past 30 years of legal reforms have affected the experience of China's court users. Amid accounts of financial stress, lawyer-client tensions and the hunt for elite allies, what emerges is a story of variation. Although plaintiffs and lawyers agree that environmental cases are hard and wringing concessions out of polluters requires remarkable persistence, the process sometimes creaks forward so that appraisals are conducted on time, help is solicited and compensation won. How Chinese courts work (and how well they work) depends on local circumstances, an insight that suggests that disaggregating expansive concepts like rule of law is a helpful way to explore complexity instead of glossing over it.
Well-known tools of state coercion, such as administrative punishment, imprisonment, and violence, affect far fewer than 1% of Chinese journalists and lawyers. What, then, keeps the other 99% in line? Building on work detailing control strategies in illiberal states, the authors suggest that the answer is more complicated than the usual story of heavy-handed repression. Instead, deep-rooted uncertainty about the boundaries of permissible political action magnifies the effect of each crackdown. Unsure of the limits of state tolerance, lawyers and journalists frequently self-censor, effectively controlling themselves. But self-censorship does not always mean total retreat from political concerns. Rather, didactic stories about transgression help the politically inclined map the gray zone between (relatively) safe and unacceptably risky choices. For all but the most optimistic risk takers, these stories—which we call control parables—harden limits on activism by illustrating a set of prescriptions designed to prevent future clashes with authority. The rules for daily behavior, in short, are not handed down from the pinnacle of the state but jointly written (and rewritten) by Chinese public professionals and their government overseers.
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