Company operations are characterized by information asymmetry between the agent (management and the board of directors) and the principal (shareholders). The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the extent of monitoring mechanisms in Nigerian non-financial listed companies and the impact of managerial ownership and horizontal-agency-costs on the mechanisms. The study adopted a quantitative approach and distributed 332 questionnaires to 166 non-financial listed companies to obtain a cross-sectional data for the internal auditing. The findings give credible evidence that the horizontal-agency-cost is positively significant while managerial ownership is negatively significant. The findings of this study suggest policy implications for the monitoring roles of the board of directors as well as the internal and external auditors. Likewise, the findings are useful to the regulatory agencies and government for a further review of corporate governance guidelines. This paper contributes to knowledge by combining the three dimensions of monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal and external auditing) in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Over the past decade, most studies in corporate governance and audit market have emphasised the importance of monitoring mechanisms (MM), especially after the global economic meltdown resulting from the Enron saga. The literature on MM continues growing as many countries especially the Sub-Saharan Africa are still struggling to come out of the effect of the economic meltdown and businesses continues to fail or merge. This paper, therefore, examines the relationship between Managerial Ownership (MO) and MMs with quality-differentiated auditors (QDA) as the channel for the relationship. The study used data from non-financial listed companies in Nigeria providing empirical supports that MO significantly associates with MMs in the right direction. Likewise, QDA also influences the MMs in the right direction suggesting that QDA is necessarily required to enhance adequate MMs. The findings of this study provide support for the association of MO and MMs with the intervention of QDA for solutions to agency problems. Companies should, therefore, motivate the management to own shares within the reasonable range that aligns the interest of the management with that of the shareholders. This paper adds to knowledge especially in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa by examining a mediating effect to depict the relationship between MO and MM, which are not evident in prior studies.

In the advent of artificial intelligence, internet of things, self- driving vehicles, nanotechnology, renewable energy, quantum computing, and biotechnology has taken centre stage. New markets will emerge, partly or wholly displacing others that will require new skill sets for employment and transform how and where people work. Thus, the skills required in both old and new occupations are bound to change in a specific working environment and transform how and where people work. The objective of this study is to examine the moderating impact of attitude (ATT) on skills (SK) and task performance fraud risk assessment (TPFRA) of professional accountants conceptually. This study possesses the capacity to impact the ethical, legal, regulatory, and institutional framework. Furthermore, the study possesses the abilities to persuade the efficient and effective policy formulations and enhance capacity building of the workforce in the public sector. To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, this may perhaps be the first conceptual study on the accountant's attitude as an indispensable capability requirement for skills and task performance fraud risk assessment in the specific working environment.

Many companies are closing down after the global economic melt-down of 2008 that involved ERON. The biggest problem for such business failures as identified by practitioners and academicians is information asymmetry existing in the relationship of the managements with the shareholders. This study seeks to investigate how monitoring mechanisms influence the block-holders in 111 Nigerian non-financial listed companies to resolve this problem. The study also investigates the mediating effect of the quality-differentiated auditors on the relationship between block-holders and monitoring mechanisms. The investigation adopted quantitative analysis using Stata to test related hypotheses. The findings indicate that the block-holders significantly influence monitoring mechanisms. The results also reveal that quality-differentiated auditors positively affect monitoring mechanisms and that it significantly explains the relationship between block-holders and monitoring mechanisms. Thus, this paper adds to knowledge on the subject of monitoring mechanisms and its scopes (directorship, internal and external auditing). These findings have policy implications for the board of directors to execute their monitoring responsibilities and guide them in external audit type selection. The findings also provide policy suggestions for both the internal and external auditors. The results can also be beneficial for the regulatory agencies and government to further review the guidelines for corporate governance. The paper adds to knowledge in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially, Nigeria by examining a mediating effect to expose the relationship between block-holders and monitoring mechanisms, which are not clear or exist in the previous studies.

Corruption has become an identification label for many African countries of which Nigeria is one of the top listed countries. Monitoring mechanisms (MM) is therefore at the forefront of issues being considered by governments, company boards of directors, regulators, and management to ensure transparency, accountability, and protection of the shareholders' interests. Risk management is connected with components of internal control (risks assessment, monitoring, and control activities) which is a vital instrument to mitigate agency problems emanating from corruption and moral hazards in companies. It is, therefore, essential to understand Risk Management Committee (RMC) as one of the organisational attributes that can affect MM. The relationship between RMC and MM has not been empirically tested, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, this paper examines the relationship between RMC and monitoring mechanisms. It provides empirical supports that RMC associates with monitoring mechanisms to reduce agency problems, using the data (2010-2012) of Nigerian non-financial listed companies. The board of directors of Nigerian companies is encouraged by this research to explore the usefulness of RMC in monitoring the management and controlling shareholders to lessen agency problems and protect the interests of the minority shareholders.