On September 22, 2020, this report was posted as an MMWR Early Release on the MMWR website (https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr). Contact tracing is a strategy implemented to minimize the spread of communicable diseases (1,2). Prompt contact tracing, testing, and self-quarantine can reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (3,4). Community engagement is important to encourage participation in and cooperation with SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing (5). Substantial investments have been made to scale up contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States. During June 1-July 12, 2020, the incidence of COVID-19 cases in North Carolina increased 183%, from seven to 19 per 100,000 persons per day* (6). To assess local COVID-19 contact tracing implementation, data from two counties in North Carolina were analyzed during a period of high incidence. Health department staff members investigated 5,514 (77%) persons with COVID-19 in Mecklenburg County and 584 (99%) in Randolph Counties. No contacts were reported for 48% of cases in Mecklenburg and for 35% in Randolph. Among contacts provided, 25% in Mecklenburg and 48% in Randolph could not be reached by telephone and were classified as nonresponsive after at least one attempt on 3 consecutive days of failed attempts. The median interval from specimen collection from the index patient to notification of identified contacts was 6 days in both counties. Despite aggressive efforts by health department staff members to perform case investigations and contact tracing, many persons with COVID-19 did not report contacts, and many contacts were not reached. These findings indicate that improved timeliness of contact tracing, community engagement, and increased use of community-wide mitigation are needed to interrupt SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Routinely collected case investigation and contact tracing data from June 1-30, 2020, for Mecklenburg, and from June 15-July 12, 2020, for Randolph counties were analyzed. Case investigations were conducted for persons with laboratoryconfirmed COVID-19, including the elicitation of persons potentially exposed to the index patient (3). Contact tracing was performed for persons identified as close contacts and included inquiry about COVID-19-compatible symptoms † and instructions to self-quarantine for 14 days since last exposure (3). Health

IMPORTANCE Contact tracing is a multistep process to limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Gaps in the process result in missed opportunities to prevent COVID-19.OBJECTIVE To quantify proportions of cases and their contacts reached by public health authorities and the amount of time needed to reach them and to compare the risk of a positive COVID-19 test result between contacts and the general public during 4-week assessment periods.

Avian and human influenza A viruses alike have shown a capacity to use the eye as a portal of entry and cause ocular disease in human beings. However, whereas influenza viruses generally represent a respiratory pathogen and only occasionally cause ocular complications, the H7 virus subtype stands alone in possessing an ocular tropism. Clarifying what confers such non-respiratory tropism to a respiratory virus will permit a greater ability to identify, treat, and prevent zoonotic human infection following ocular exposure to influenza viruses; especially those within the H7 subtype, which continue to cause avian epidemics on many continents.

Monkeypox virus and varicellazoster virus (VZV) cause visually similar rash illnesses. Monkeypox is more virulent, with fatality rates up to 10%. In June 2007, reports were received of a rash illness outbreak in isolated villages in Likouala district, Republic of the Congo. Blood specimens were obtained from 142 individuals reporting rash illness between January and September 2007 from four villages in Likouala. Thirty-seven cases of probable VZV were identified based on low VZV IgG avidity; cases occurred in all four villages. No probable monkeypox cases with orthopoxvirus-positive IgM responses were observed; however, three possible monkeypox cases, in individuals < 26 years of age, with rash illness occurring > 56 days before sampling and positive orthopoxvirus-specific IgG responses, were identified. Remoteness and delays in reporting limited collection of acute diagnostic specimens. Improvements in rash illness surveillance and infection control, through training of health workers and timely acquisition of diagnostic specimens, are being undertaken.

In August 2014, the Viral Special Pathogens Branch of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established a field laboratory in Sierra Leone in response to the ongoing Ebola virus outbreak. Through March 2015, this laboratory tested >12 000 specimens from throughout Sierra Leone. We describe the organization and procedures of the laboratory located in Bo, Sierra Leone.

Context:The implementation of case investigation and contact tracing (CICT) for controlling COVID-19 (caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus) has proven challenging due to varying levels of public acceptance and initially constrained resources, especially enough trained staff. Evaluating the impacts of CICT will aid efforts to improve such programs. Objectives: Estimate the number of COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations averted by CICT and identify CICT processes that could improve overall effectiveness. Design: We used data on the proportion of cases interviewed, contacts notified or monitored, and days from testing to case and contact notification from 14 jurisdictions to model the impact of CICT on cumulative case counts and hospitalizations over a 60-day period. Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's COVIDTracer Advanced tool, we estimated a range of impacts by assuming either contacts would quarantine only if monitored or would do so upon notification of potential exposure. We also varied the observed program metrics to assess their relative influence. Results: Performance by jurisdictions varied widely. Jurisdictions isolated between 12% and 86% of cases (including contacts that became cases) within 6 to 10 days after infection. We estimated that CICT-related reductions in transmission ranged from 0.4% to 32%. For every 100 remaining cases after other nonpharmaceutical interventions were implemented, CICT averted between 4 and 97 additional cases. Reducing time to case isolation by 1 day increased averted case estimates by up to 15 percentage points. Increasing the proportion of cases interviewed or contacts notified by 20 percentage points each resulted in at most 3 or 6 percentage point improvements in averted cases. Conclusions: We estimated that CICT reduced the number of COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations among all jurisdictions studied. Reducing time to isolation produced the greatest improvements in impact of CICT.

Objective To evaluate participation in COVID-19 case investigation and contact tracing in central Washington State between June 15 and July 12, 2020. Methods In this retrospective observational evaluation we combined SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR and antigen test reports from the Washington Disease Reporting System with community case investigation and contact tracing data for 3 health districts (comprising 5 counties) in central Washington State. All 3 health districts have large Hispanic communities disproportionately affected by COVID-19. Results Investigators attempted to call all referred individuals with COVID-19 (n = 4,987); 71% were interviewed. Of those asked about close contacts (n = 3,572), 68% reported having no close contacts, with similar proportions across ethnicity, sex, and age group. The 968 individuals with COVID-19 who named specific contacts (27% of those asked) reported a total of 2,293 contacts (mean of 2.4 contacts per individual with COVID-19); 85% of listed contacts participated in an interview. Conclusions Most individuals with COVID-19 reported having no close contacts. Increasing community engagement and public messaging, as well as understanding and addressing barriers to participation, are crucial for CICT to contribute meaningfully to controlling the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

Introduction: Case investigation and contact tracing are important tools to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, particularly when implemented efficiently. Our objective was to evaluate participation in and timeliness of COVID-19 contact tracing and whether these measures changed over time.Methods: We retrospectively assessed COVID-19 case investigation and contact tracing surveillance data from the Washington State centralized program for August 1–31, 2020 and October 1–31, 2020. We combined SARS-CoV-2 testing reports with contact tracing data to compare completeness, reporting of contacts, and program timeliness.Results: For August and October respectively, 4,600 (of 12,521) and 2,166 (of 16,269) individuals with COVID-19 were referred to the state program for case investigation. Investigators called 100% of referred individuals; 65% (August) and 76% (October) were interviewed. Of individuals interviewed, 33% reported contacts in August and 45% in October, with only mild variation by age, sex, race/ethnicity, and urbanicity. In August, 992 individuals with COVID-19 reported a total of 2,584 contacts (mean, 2.6), and in October, 739 individuals reported 2,218 contacts (mean, 3.0). Among contacts, 86% and 78% participated in interviews for August and October. The median time elapsed from specimen collection to contact interview was 4 days in August and 3 days in October, and from symptom onset to contact interview was 7 days in August and 6 days in October.Conclusions: While contact tracing improved with time, the proportion of individuals disclosing contacts remained below 50% and differed minimally by demographic characteristics. The longest time interval occurred between symptom onset and test result notification. Improving elicitation of contacts and timeliness of contact tracing may further decrease SARS-CoV-2 transmission.