An outbreak of waterborne cryptosporidiosis affecting 27 persons, diagnosed stool positive, occurred in Ayrshire in April 1988. Twenty-one in 27 confirmed cases required some form of fluid replacement therapy. Local general practitioners indicated a two- to fivefold increase in diarrhoeal disease during the outbreak, and following enquiries made by Environmental Health Officers it became apparent that many hundreds of people had suffered a diarrhoeal illness at that time. Cryptosporidium spp. oocysts were detected in the treated chlorinated water supply system, in the absence of faecal bacterial indicators. Oocyst contamination of a break-pressure tank containing final water for distribution was the cause of this waterborne outbreak. An irregular seepage of oocyst-containing water, which increased during heavy rains, was the cause of the break-pressure tank contamination, rather than a failure of the water-treatment processes. The waterborne route should be considered when clusters of cryptosporidiosis-associated with potable water occur. Waterborne cryptosporidiosis can occur in the absence of other faecal indicators of contamination.
An outbreak of infectious diarrhea with 70 laboratory-confirmed cases (58 with Giardia lamblia) and 107 probable cases occurred in U.K. tourists who stayed in a hotel in Greece. After a cluster of six cases in persons who had stayed at the hotel was reported, the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre began active case ascertainment. This outbreak illustrates the value of an approach to surveillance that integrates routine surveillance data with active case ascertainment.
In February and in June 1998, two people developed acute hepatitis B following in-patient care in a district general hospital. Initial enquiries indicated their infections were not attributable to staff undertaking exposure-prone procedures (EPPs). We report the findings and implications of the subsequent investigation: a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency investigation, including molecular epidemiological analysis. Occupational Health records showed that staff involved in EPPs with the patients were HBsAg negative. No contact between the patients was identified nor were there failures in sterilization. The patients' HBV strains were identical, indicating a common source. A total of 231 out of 232 staff who might have treated either patient were tested for HBsAg; the remaining doctor, working abroad, was HBsAg- and HBeAg-positive and had the same HBV strain as the patients. On two occasions the doctor's hand had been cut while breaking glass vials, but there was no documentation linking these events to the two patients. The doctor had been vaccinated in 1993 and tested for anti-HBs prior to commencing work in 1997. The doctor was recalled to Occupational Health but did not attend and was not followed up. In total, 4948 patients potentially treated by the doctor received an explanatory letter and 3150 were tested for HBsAg. Only one was positive, and HBV sequencing showed no link to the doctor. Occasionally transmission of HBV from heath-care workers can occur in a non-EPP setting and the implications of this require examination by those setting national policy. Occupational Health Services should investigate clinical heath-care workers who do not respond to vaccination. They should ensure HBV carriers are identified and offer them appropriate advice to prevent transmission to patients.
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