To solve the financing problem of the food producers, we consider a two-echelon contract food supply chain composed of a family farm with capital constraints and a food processing enterprise. With no capital constraints as the benchmark model, we analyze optimal decisions of the family farm and the food processing enterprise in the case of bank financing with bank participation only and bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation. Then, we discuss how the risk of yield uncertainty influences the optimal decisions and profits of the family farm and the food processing enterprise under different financing situation. Meanwhile, the reason why the government subsidizes agriculture is explored, and the policy of minimum purchase price of the food is initiated when the market price is too low. Finally, the numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented. The results show that the bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation improves the welfare of supply chain members more obviously than the bank financing with bank participation only; when the rice price is too low, the policy of minimum purchase price of food is initiated, which increases the revenue and the growing enthusiasm of the family farm; the profits of the family farm and the food processing enterprise will decrease as the risk of yield uncertainty increases in the case of bank financing, and the risk of yield uncertainty will be reduced for the family farm when bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation.
Collusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hiddenness. Different SCF transaction structures will affect the profits of supply chain members from collusion. This paper develops various game models for collusion and not collusion for different SCF transaction structures and investigates the impact of SCF transaction structures on the boundary conditions of collusion. Through comparative analysis, the findings of models are as follows: (1) in a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier and retailer are more likely to conduct collusion under the sequential game than under the simultaneous game; (2) collusion in the two-echelon supply chain can obtain higher loans than that in the three-echelon supply chain, so it has more serious hidden danger; (3) in the two-echelon supply chain, collusion is easier to form than in the three-echelon SCF supply chain that has spontaneous endogenous constraints. We also develop two types of mechanisms to restrain collusion behavior from profit sharing and incomplete information perspectives. Finally, we summarize the theoretical implications and analyze the management implications through a case study.
In the real business environment, due to unpredictable market demand or high prediction difficulty and low prediction accuracy, there will be inevitably operational loss in the field of e-commerce logistics caused by undersupply or oversupply of express service capabilities. At present, China is deepening the supply-side structural reforms. Confronted with the growing demand for e-commerce logistics express delivery, especially the urgent demand for tackling orders piling up to 1 billion pieces during the recent “Double 11” shopping carnival, it is very important and practical for us to study how to make scientific decisions on the supply side in the field of e-commerce express delivery. Therefore, in this paper, we design a sharing logistics cooperation mechanism considering both the undersupply and oversupply of express delivery service capabilities under stochastic demand. By comparing the earnings data of several listed express companies, we analyze four types of optimization strategies: the order flow proportion revenue sharing strategy (RE-OFP), the combined factors revenue sharing strategy (RE-RSF), the order flow proportion risk sharing strategy (RS-OFP), and the combined factors risk sharing strategy (RS-RSF). The research results demonstrate that the four optimization strategies of RE-OFP, RE-RSF, RS-OFP, and RS-RSF could achieve Pareto improvements in the operational performance of e-commerce express service. The performance of four revenue sharing and risk sharing strategies varies with different revenue sharing or risk sharing factors. Under some certain combined factors, the revenue sharing contract could help realize the supply chain coordination of the sharing logistics service. The sharing logistics cooperation mechanism based on equity investment proposed hereafter provides a feasible solution to solve the problems of high empty driving rate and operational cost of e-commerce express delivery service in urban areas.
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