QoS-aware service selection deals with choosing the service providers from the candidates which are discovered to fulfill a requirement, while meeting specific QoS constraints. In fact, the requester and its candidate service providers usually are autonomous and self-interested. In the case, there is a private information game of the service selection between a requester and its candidate providers. An ideal solution of the game is that the requester selects and reaches agreement about the interest allocation with the high-QoS and low-cost service providers. This paper proposes an approach to design a novel incentive mechanism to get the ideal solution of the game. The incentive mechanism design is solved as a constrained optimization problem. Finally, the experiments are performed to show the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism.
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