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The Global Value Chains/Global Production Networks (GVC/GPNs) literatures have become the predominant international political economy frameworks to understand the challenge of economic upgrading under 21st century globalization. However, until recently, this literature has overlooked the role of the state (outside its regulatory responsibilities) and the explanatory power of domestic political economy. Meanwhile, literature on developmental states, industrial policy and political settlements has generally taken a methodologically nationalist perspective to examine economic transformation in developing countries. This article uses insights from the political settlements literature to contribute to the growing agenda within the GVC/GPNs literature to examine how the role of the state and domestic politics shape upgrading pathways in developing countries. Using the example of the Rwandan government's attempts to increase specialty coffee exports over the last two decades, the article shows how the public governance of the domestic value chain, combined with governance dynamics in the coffee GVC/GPN, has shaped upgrading pathways in Rwanda's coffee sector. By developing a domestic political economy approach within the GVC/GPN tradition, this article contributes to the growing attention within international political economy to focus on how multi-scalar pressures are shaping the outcomes of economic policy in developing countries. reviewers provided thoughtful comments that have improved this paper. Thanks also the RIPE editors and reviewers who provided extremely constructive comments. Early versions of this paper were presented in The

The environmental damage that plastic waste is causing has catalyzed government action against plastic bags around the world. Despite anti-plastic bag policies gaining traction globally, there has been limited investigation of why the implementation of bans has varied. The variation in implementing bans is particularly stark in East Africa, a region that has been at the forefront of plastic bag legislation. Rwanda’s implementation of a ban on plastic bags in 2008 has attracted widespread praise for its environmental leadership. Kenya adopted a plastic bag ban before Rwanda but implementation was consistently delayed until a stringent ban was finally imposed in 2018. In Uganda, despite bans being announced on four separate occasions, implementation continues to be delayed. This paper explains why some governments adopt and effectively enforce plastic bag bans while others reverse course or delay implementation. Existing literature has cited the comparative strength of plastic industries as the salient factor in explaining varied adoption of plastic bag bans. This paper argues that though the comparative business power of plastic industries explains whether bans are obstructed, it does not satisfactorily explain varied implementation. Instead, countries that pursue services-based development strategies, which prioritise externally dependent sectors like tourism, are more likely to implement plastic bag bans, which can help bolster their green credentials. For the Rwandan and Kenyan governments, presenting their countries as environmental leaders contributed to their goals of becoming a regional economic hub, reliant on services like tourism. The Kenyan government’s decision to eventually implement the ban was driven by a perceived need to compete with Rwanda for regional environmental leadership while supporting Kenya’s services-based economic development strategy. In contrast, Uganda’s comparatively larger discovery of oil and limited emphasis on services-based development explained the government’s lack of commitment to implementing a plastic bag ban.

Different strategies have been used by the Rwandan government to promote capitalist accumulation. In some sectors, party and military owned enterprises are predominant. In others, the government has chosen to embrace market-led reforms. Ultimately, the vulnerability experienced by ruling elites contributes to the choice of how capital accumulation is promoted in different sectors. Ruling elites use party and military enterprises to centralise rents and establish control over the direction of economic policy. However, centralising rents is a political choice and excludes individuals from developing access to rents. The pyrethrum sector shows that the use of such groups has resulted in unequal outcomes despite increases in productivity. Reduced international prices have stunted further productivity. Conversely, the mining sector shows evidence of the pursuit of market-led reforms. These reforms have been accompanied by rapid growth in domestic production and exports. Foreign investment was necessary in order to bring capital and expertise to the sector. However, the government has struggled to retain the capacity to enforce legislation and discipline foreign investors in line with national priorities. Both sectors show evidence that ruling elites have been prompted by vulnerability to commit to economic development. Constraints that have accompanied strategies pursued in these sectors have forced the government to work ‘reactively’ to achieve strategic targets.