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This article examines the product innovation management strategy of a developed economy multinational corporation case in India. Drawing on institutional theory, the analysis indicates that product innovation for emerging markets is essentially built on the frugal innovation capabilities of a firm. The findings show that through frugal engineering, bricolage, and modularity, it is possible to implement frugal innovation that creates value with less resource and at low costs. Further, the analysis shows how developing a collaborative ecosystem along with a deep embeddedness in the local economy facilitates frugal innovation. The article has important implications for theory and management practice.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of political connections in the emerging market context. Design/methodology/approach A case study analysis of three Russian pharmaceutical firms is conducted to uncover how they performed through the Russian transition – the institutional upheaval of the 1990s – and the ongoing state-led industrialization. Findings In the early years of transition, firms heavily rely on political networking to gain legitimacy and fill institutional voids. As institutions strengthen, the need for political networking is being substituted by arm’s length networking. Strengthening of institutions also results in a more stable business environment, evolving firms’ strategies from short-term core competency concentration to long-term innovative visions. Research limitations/implications Firms operating in the Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States and some other Eastern European state domains must be wary of complex ties that are prevalent in these countries and often can assist or hinder firm performance. Although formal institutions strengthen arm’s length networks, a close cooperation between strategic firms and the state remains. Originality/value The paper proposes two phases of the Russian transition and provides a taxonomy of strategic choices of Russian firms during the transition. Further, the paper describes the key institutional developments in the two phases of the Russian transition. Finally, a framework of political connections and their role in business operations in the two phases of the transition is provided.

This article examines how the introduction of a mix of state and marketbased regulatory mechanisms representing formal and informal institutional elements, respectively, impacts disclosure level of director and executive remuneration in Australia. In doing so, our study steps beyond the simple state versus market dichotomy that the extant literature is primarily concerned with and proposes a symbiotic relationship between the two. The results of our study reveal that both state regulation and self-regulation as bundles of corporate governance can potentially join forces to ease agency conflicts. What is more, certain well-institutionalized organizational practices that guide agents toward self-regulation remain highly relevant and significant, even in the presence of pervasive state regulation. The synthesis of constructs borrowed from agency and institutional theories and its testing in an empirical setting of Australia verifies the significance of formal (state regulation) and informal (self-regulation) institutional aspects in addressing moral hazard agency conflicts. Our research provides insights for public policy

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