In recent years, “nudging” has become a standard behavioral intervention at the individual level and for the design of social policies. Although nudges are effective, such interventions seem to be limited to a given space and time, and there is only scant evidence to support the contrary view. On the other hand, choice architects may utilize another type of intervention called “boosting,” which shows the promise of generalized and lasting behavioral change. A government can use these tools to shape public policy. Behavioral interventions such as policy-making tools have their boundaries, as does the law. We argue that nudging and boosting may serve as active local or global aids in support of the legal system under certain circumstances. Nudging and boosting can also support the legal system, especially in relation to emerging social issues or events that are unprecedented, such as the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, where certain behavioral patterns are expected, but it would be difficult or impossible to enforce them through the law alone.
Przedmiotem rozważań podjętych przez Autorów w niniejszym artykule jest problematyka prawna związana z możliwością dochodzenia roszczenia z tytułu naruszenia dóbr osobistych w Internecie od bezpośredniego sprawcy naruszenia przez pryzmat konieczności ustalenia danych osobowych naruszyciela. Omówiono możliwość złożenia wniosku o udostępnienie tych danych do service providera, uwzględniając zarówno stanowisko wyrażane przez ETS, jak i krajowe sądownictwo administracyjne. Zwrócono uwagę na fakt, że trudność w ustaleniu tych danych (przede wszystkim zgodnie z zapisami ustawy z dnia 18 lipca 2002 r. o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną) skutkuje nieprawidłową praktyką inicjowania postępowania karnego, co z kolei powoduje obciążenie organów dochodzeniowych zadaniami nie służącymi celom procesu karnego a cywilnego.
In recent years, “nudging” has become a standard behavioral intervention at the individual level and for thedesign of social policies. Although nudges are effective, such interventions seem to be limited to a given spaceand time, and there is only scant evidence to support the contrary view. On the other hand, choice architects mayutilize another type of intervention called “boosting,” which shows the promise of generalized and lastingbehavioral change. The government can use these tools to shape public policy. Behavioral interventions such aspolicy-making tools have their boundaries, as does the law. We argue that nudging and boosting may serve asactive aids in support of the legal system under certain circumstances. Nudging and boosting can also supportthe legal system especially in relation to emerging social issues or events that are unprecedented, such as therecent COVID-19 pandemic, where certain behavioral patterns are expected, but it would be hard or impossibleto enforce them through the law alone.
Celem analizy przeprowadzonej w niniejszym artykule było wskazanie zakresu odpowiedzialności za naruszenie dóbr osobistych osoby, która w Internecie umieszcza hiperlink do materiału naruszającego dobra osobiste innej osoby. Ponadto analizie poddano, w jakich sytuacjach, powołując się na działanie w ramach kontratypu, osoba ta będzie mogła uchylić się od odpowiedzialności. W toku analizy autorzy skupili uwagę na problematyce naruszenia dobra osobistego w postaci czci, choć dokonując udostępnienia, określony użytkownik może naruszyć także inne dobra osobiste, w tym wymienione w art. 23 k.c. W rozważaniach uwzględniono, iż naruszenie czci może przybrać zarówno postać przekazu werbalnego, jak i niewerbalnego, ale także może nastąpić przez zamieszczenie określonej treści z wykorzystaniem funkcjonalności serwisów społecznościowych. Dokonano także rozróżnienia udostępnianych materiałów, mając na uwadze podmiot, od którego określony materiał pochodzi, jak i podmiot, który go udostępnia. Kwestia ta nie pozostaje bowiem bez znaczenia dla ewentualnej możliwości uchylenia się od odpowiedzialności przez podmiot udostępniający materiał.
The Act of February 4, 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights, which regulates issues related to the protection of copyrights, belongs to the private law system (its provi- sions protect the private interest). However, the Act includes both administrative and criminal law provisions aimed at protecting the public interest. The literature rightly points out that the systemic division into public and private law is becoming increasingly less pronounced, due to the permeation of legal domains belonging to both systems. An example of such interpenetration are the provisions of copyright law. This statement is significant for the considerations made in this article due to the statutory method of penalising certain behaviour contained in the provisions of the Copyright and Related Rights Act. Criminal law provisions, systemically related to public law and protecting the public interest, contain references to the provisions of the Copyright and Related Rights Act regulating the scope of copyright protection, i.e. private law norms. In the context of the requirements that should be met by criminal law, such a reference raises doubts, which are particularly highlighted in Art. 115 para. 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act. This issue is impor- tant because the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 17 February 2015, Ref. K 15/13 recognised this provision as constitutional. Therefore, he concluded that the principle of the specificity of a criminal act does not preclude the legislator from using terms that are imprecise or vague if their designations can be determined. At the same time, the Constitutional Tribunal has not presented any arguments indicating that in this case the determination of the designates of Art. 115 para. 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act does not cause any difficulties. The author of this article attempts to determine the extent of criminal liability in the event of a violation of author’s moral rights (Article 115 section 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act), at the same time indicating the difficulties that are associated with the unambiguous determination of behaviour which Art. 115 para. 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act penalises.
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