Drawing on the process of resource orchestration, we argue a co‐alignment of multiple factors is needed for family firms to increase performance through entrepreneurship. Specifically, we posit that entrepreneurial orientation provides the mobilizing vision to use the heterogeneous yet complementary knowledge and experiences offered by increased generational involvement toward entrepreneurship. However, without a coordinating mechanism, generational involvement leads to conflict and negative outcomes. When, instead, it is also coordinated via a participative strategy, performance gains are achieved. In sum, results suggest that realizing the benefits from entrepreneurship in family firms is a complicated matter affected by the synchronization of entrepreneurial orientation, generational involvement, and participative strategy. Copyright © 2011 Strategic Management Society.

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Empirical research on international entrepreneurship is growing, but results on the role of family ownership in this phenomenon are inconsistent. We believe these inconsistencies owe to prior researchers having not yet investigated nonlinear relationships. Drawing on opposing perspectives of stewardship and stagnation, we explore potential benefits and drawbacks of family ownership for international entrepreneurship and explore nonlinear relationships among these two variables. Using a sample of 1,035 US family businesses and applying ordinal regression analysis, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between family ownership and international entrepreneurship: International entrepreneurship is maximized when family ownership stands at moderate levels. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice and indicate avenues for future research.

The present study contends that an inverted U–shaped relationship exists between generational involvement—i.e., the number of family generations simultaneously involved in the family–firm top management team (TMT)—and entrepreneurial orientation (EO). Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we conceive generational involvement as a proxy of knowledge diversity in multigenerational family TMTs. We argue that while moderate levels of generational involvement stimulate task–related constructive conflicts for EO, increased kinship distance and relationship conflicts led by high levels of generational involvement are likely to undermine this potential advantage by damaging the relational context for EO. Our hypothesis is confirmed on a data set of 199 family firms.

Research was largely consistent in predicting a negative relationship between family ownership and research and development (R&D) intensity until Chrisman and Patel, using a behavioral agency model (BAM), called this general assumption into question. They argued that publicly owned family firms typically invest less in R&D than nonfamily‐owned firms. This behavior may however be reversed if economic performance levels are below family aspirations or if family long‐term goals, such as pursuing strong transgenerational family control, are highly valued. While most researchers, like Chrisman and Patel, primarily focused on large listed firms, more research on the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity in privately held small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) is required. This is because firm size can play an important role in understanding the innovation management behavior of firms. Building on the BAM perspective, in the present paper it is argued that Chrisman and Patel's results can be extended to the context of SMEs, albeit with one important specification: the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity is likely to be contingent on the way the family has invested its wealth. Specifically, it is contended that in the context of SMEs, where goals are more fluid and mixed, when there is a high overlap between family wealth and firm equity (i.e., most of the family's wealth is invested in the firm) the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity is negative because of the family owners' greater desire to protect their socioemotional wealth (SEW). However, if the overlap between the family's total wealth and single firm equity is low (i.e., firm equity is just a small part of the total family wealth), the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity is positive as the low overlap between family wealth and firm equity reduces the family's loss aversion propensity. In such a situation, family ownership is likely to foster R&D intensity because of the long‐term orientation of family owners that increases the family firm's propensity to bear the risk of investing in R&D activities. The hypothesis is tested and confirmed in a study of 240 small‐ and medium‐sized firms based in Italy. The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, adding to the literature on innovation management and R&D intensity, it increases the understanding of what drives or inhibits R&D investments in SMEs when a family is involved in the ownership of the firm. This is particularly important because research on innovation management, as well as research on R&D intensity in family firms, is primarily focused on large firms and much less on SMEs. Second, the study complements arguments from prior research on the correlates of R&D intensity in large listed firms, showing that the BAM and SEW perspective offer a theoretical framework that is also able to illustrate the complex nature of innovation management in the context of SMEs. Third, the study contributes to research on the e...