No abstract

Over the past decade, an increasing number of studies have shown that the performance of specific actions (e.g., approach and avoidance) in response to a stimulus can lead to changes in how that stimulus is evaluated. In contrast to the reigning idea that these effects are mediated by the automatic formation and activation of associations in memory, we describe an inferential account that specifies the inferences underlying the effects and how these inferences are formed. We draw on predictive processing theories to explain the basic processes underlying inferential reasoning and their main characteristics. Our inferential account accommodates past findings, is supported by new findings, and leads to novel predictions as well as concrete recommendations for how action performance can be used to influence real-world behavior.

Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a certain stimulus changes the liking of this stimulus. We investigated whether these effects of approach and avoidance training occur also when participants do not perform these actions but are merely instructed about the stimulus-action contingencies. Stimulus evaluations were registered using both implicit (Implicit Association Test and evaluative priming) and explicit measures (valence ratings). Instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were observed for relatively neutral fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites), but not for clearly valenced well-known social groups (i.e., Blacks and Whites). We conclude that instructions to approach or avoid stimuli can provide sufficient bases for establishing both implicit and explicit evaluations of novel stimuli and discuss several possible reasons for why similar instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were not found for valenced well-known stimuli.

Previous research has shown that linking approach or avoidance actions to novel stimuli through mere instructions causes changes in the implicit evaluation of these stimuli even when the actions are never performed. In two high-powered experiments (total N = 1147), we examined whether effects of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit evaluations are mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. Participants first received information about the evaluative properties of two fictitious social groups (e.g., Niffites are good; Luupites are bad) and then received instructions to approach one group and avoid the other group. We observed an effect of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit but not explicit evaluations of the groups, even when these instructions were incompatible with the previously obtained evaluative information. These results indicate that approach-avoidance instructions allow for unintentional changes in implicit evaluations. We discuss implications for current theories of implicit evaluation.

Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a stimulus changes the liking of that stimulus. In two experiments, we investigated the relationship between, on one hand, effects of approach-avoidance (AA) training on implicit and explicit evaluations of novel faces and, on the other hand, contingency awareness as indexed by participants' memory for the relation between stimulus and action. We observed stronger effects for faces that were classified as contingency aware and found no evidence that AA training caused changes in stimulus evaluations in the absence of contingency awareness. These findings challenge the standard view that AA training effects are (exclusively) the product of implicit learning processes, such as the automatic formation of associations in memory.

The repeated performance of approach or avoidance actions in response to specific stimuli (e.g., alcoholic drinks) is often considered a most promising type of cognitive bias modification that can reduce unwanted behavior (e.g., alcohol consumption). Unfortunately, approach-avoidance training sometimes fails to produce desired outcomes (e.g., in the context of unhealthy eating). We introduce a novel training task in which approach-avoidance actions are followed by affective consequences. Four experiments (total N = 1547) found stronger changes in voluntary approachavoidance behavior, implicit and explicit evaluations and consumer choices for consequencebased approach-avoidance training in the food domain. Moreover, this novel type of training reduced self-reported unhealthy eating behavior after a 24-hour delay and unhealthy snacking in a taste test. Our results contrast with dominant (association-formation) accounts of approachavoidance training effects and support an inferential explanation. They further suggest that consequence-based approach-avoidance training, and inference training more generally, holds promise for the treatment of clinical behavior.

It is often assumed that, once established, spontaneous or implicit evaluations are resistant to immediate change. Recent research contradicts this theoretical stance, showing that a person's implicit evaluations of an attitude object can be changed rapidly in the face of new counterattitudinal information. Importantly, it remains unknown whether such changes can also occur for deep-rooted implicit evaluations of well-known attitude objects. We address this question by examining whether the acquisition of negative information changes implicit evaluations of a well-known positive historic figure: Mahatma Gandhi. We report three experiments showing rapid changes in implicit evaluations of Gandhi as measured with an Affect Misattribution Procedure and Evaluative Priming Task but not with an Implicit Association Test (IAT). These findings suggest that implicit evaluations based on deep-rooted representations are subjective to rapid changes in the face of expectancy-violating information, while pointing to limitations of the IAT for assessing such changes.

Studies on evaluative conditioning show that a change in liking can occur whenever stimuli are paired. Such instances of attitude change are known to depend on the type of relation established between stimuli (e.g., "Bob is a friend of Mike" vs. "Bob is an enemy of Mike"). Research has so far only compared assimilative and contrastive relational qualifiers (e.g., friend vs. enemy). For the first time, we compared the effect of nonoppositional qualifiers on attitude change in an evaluative conditioning procedure (e.g., "Bob causes Positive Outcomes" vs. "Bob predicts Positive Outcomes"). Differential effects of nonoppositional relational qualifiers were observed on explicit and implicit evaluations. We discuss the implications of our findings for attitude research, theories of attitude change, and optimizing evaluative conditioning for changing attitudes in applied settings.