Recent studies using continuous flash suppression suggest that invisible stimuli are processed as integrated, semantic entities. We challenge the viability of this account, given recent findings on the neural basis of interocular suppression and replication failures of high-profile CFS studies. We conclude that CFS reveals stimulus fractionation in visual cortex.

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) has been used as a paradigm to probe the extent to which word stimuli are processed in the absence of awareness. In the two experiments reported here, no evidence is obtained that word stimuli are processed up to the semantic level when suppressed through CFS. In Experiment 1, word stimuli did not break suppression faster than their pseudo-word variants nor was suppression time modulated by word frequency. Experiment 2 replicated these findings, but more critically showed that differential effects can be obtained with this paradigm using a simpler stimulus. In addition, pixel density of the stimuli did prove to be related to suppression time in both experiments, indicating that the paradigm is sensitive to differences in detectability. A third and final experiment replicated the well-known face inversion effect using the same set-up as Experiments 1 and 2, thereby demonstrating that the employed methodology can capture more high-level effects as well. These results are discussed in the context of previous evidence on unconscious semantic processing and two potential explanations are advanced. Specifically, it is argued that CFS might act at a level too low in the visual system for high-level effects to be observed or that the widely used breaking CFS paradigm is merely ill-suited to capture effects in the context of words.

Hassin recently proposed the “Yes It Can” (YIC) principle to describe the division of labor between conscious and unconscious processes in human cognition. According to this principle, unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive function that conscious processes can perform. In our commentary, we argue that the author presents an overly idealized review of the literature in support of the YIC principle. Furthermore, we point out that the dissimilar trends observed in social and cognitive psychology, with respect to published evidence of strong unconscious effects, can better be explained by the way how awareness is defined and measured in both research fields. Finally, we show that the experimental paradigm chosen by Hassin to rule out remaining objections against the YIC principle is unsuited to verify the new default notion that all high-level cognitive functions can unfold unconsciously.

There is an increasing trend in association football (soccer) to assist referees in their decision-making with video technology. For decisions such as whether a goal has been scored or which player actually committed a foul, video technology can provide more objective information and be valuable to increase decisional accuracy. It is unclear, however, to what extent video replays can aid referee decisions in the case of foul-play situations in which the decision is typically more ambiguous. In this study, we specifically evaluated the impact of slow-motion replays on decision-making by referees. To this end, elite referees of five different countries (n = 88) evaluated 60 different foul-play situations taken from international matches, replayed in either real time or slow motion. Our results revealed that referees penalized situations more severely in slow motion compared to real time (e.g. red card with a yellow card reference decision). Our results provide initial evidence that video replay speed can have an important impact on the disciplinary decision given by the referee in case of foul play. The study also provides a real-life test-case for theories and insights regarding causality perception.

Visual appearance (e.g., color) cues set expectations regarding the likely taste and flavor properties of food and drink. These expectations may, in turn, anchor the subsequent tasting experience. In the present study, we examined the influence of the color of a beer on the consumer’s experience. Dark and pale beers were evaluated both before and after tasting. Importantly, these beers were indistinguishable in terms of their taste/flavor when tasted without any visual cues. The results indicate that the differing visual appearance of the beers led to clear differences in expected taste/flavor. However, after tasting, no differences in flavor ratings were observed, indicating that the expectations based on visual cues did not influence the actual tasting experience. The participants also expected the dark beer to be more expensive than the pale one. These outcomes suggest that changes in the visual appearance of a beer lead to significant changes in the way in which consumers expect the beer to taste. At the same time, however, our findings also suggest the need for more evidence to be collected in order to determine the boundary conditions on when such crossmodal expectations may vs. may not affect the tasting experience.Highlights: The expected flavor of a beer is affected by its visual appearance. No differences in flavor ratings were observed on tasting. Consumers expect dark beers to be more expensive than pale/amber beers.

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a powerful interocular suppression technique, which is often described as an effective means to reliably suppress stimuli from visual awareness. Suppression through CFS has been assumed to depend upon a reduction in (retinotopically specific) neural adaptation caused by the continual updating of the contents of the visual input to one eye. In this study, we started from the observation that suppressing a moving stimulus through CFS appeared to be more effective when using a mask that was actually more prone to retinotopically specific neural adaptation, but in which the properties of the mask were more similar to those of the to-be-suppressed stimulus. In two experiments, we find that using a moving Mondrian mask (i.e., one that includes motion) is more effective in suppressing a moving stimulus than a regular CFS mask. The observed pattern of results cannot be explained by a simple simulation that computes the degree of retinotopically specific neural adaptation over time, suggesting that this kind of neural adaptation does not play a large role in predicting the differences between conditions in this context. We also find some evidence consistent with the idea that the most effective CFS mask is the one that matches the properties (speed) of the suppressed stimulus. These results question the general importance of retinotopically specific neural adaptation in CFS, and potentially help to explain an implicit trend in the literature to adapt one’s CFS mask to match one’s to-be-suppressed stimuli. Finally, the results should help to guide the methodological development of future research where continuous suppression of moving stimuli is desired.

A recent study showed that scenes with an object-background relationship that is semantically incongruent break interocular suppression faster than scenes with a semantically congruent relationship. These results implied that semantic relations between the objects and the background of a scene could be extracted in the absence of visual awareness of the stimulus. In the current study, we assessed the replicability of this finding and tried to rule out an alternative explanation dependent on low-level differences between the stimuli. Furthermore, we used a Bayesian analysis to quantify the evidence in favor of the presence or absence of a scene-congruency effect. Across three experiments, we found no convincing evidence for a scene-congruency effect or a modulation of scene congruency by scene inversion. These findings question the generalizability of previous observations and cast doubt on whether genuine semantic processing of object-background relationships in scenes can manifest during interocular suppression.

A recent study claimed to have obtained evidence that participants can solve invisible multistep arithmetic equations (Sklar et al., 2012). The authors used a priming paradigm in which reaction times to targets congruent with the equation's solution were responded to faster compared with incongruent ones. We critically reanalyzed the data set of Sklar et al. and show that the claims being made in the article are not fully supported by the alternative analyses that we applied. A Bayesian reanalysis of the data accounting for the random variability of the target stimuli in addition to the subjects shows that the evidence for priming effects is less strong than initially claimed. That is, although Bayes factors revealed evidence for the presence of a priming effect, it was generally weak. Second, the claim that unconscious arithmetic occurs for subtraction but not for addition is not supported when the critical interaction is tested. Third, the data do not show well-established features of numerosity priming as derived from V-shaped response time curves for prime-target distances. Fourth, we show that it is impossible to classify reaction times as resulting from congruent or incongruent primetarget relationships, which should be expected if their results imply that participants genuinely solve the equations on each trial. We conclude that the claims being made in the original article are not fully supported by the analyses that we apply. Together with a recent failure to replicate the original results and a critique of the analysis based on regression to the mean, we argue that the current evidence for unconscious arithmetic is inconclusive. We argue that strong claims require strong evidence and stress that cumulative research strategies are needed to provide such evidence.