The analysis of the category of minority directors is discussed in this article in an ambitious undertaking. This niche body of directors, a classification present in very few jurisdictions across the world, is discussed against the backdrop of a legal framework – Italy – where it has been codified for quite some time. Italy then will be the starting point of a legislative expedition which will firstly encounter the shores of a comparator, the United Kingdom, and its local system of corporate governance, before ultimately reaching its journey’s end in Brussels, and its legal framework of corporate governance addressed to listed companies. Based on the findings of this doctrinal analysis, it is suggested that the notion of minority directors as public safe-keepers, albeit exclusively confined to listed companies, could spearhead the agenda of the EU legislature and is a device fit for transplantation across the different corporate law frameworks, first and foremost the British one. Ultimately, through a speculative reference to the notion of ‘board diversity’ and the literature sprouted on this concept, the Italian voting list model is discussed as a means of adding both value to listed entities and efficiency to the relevant boards.
The Covid pandemic has raised various legal issues, fueling the scientific debate on the relationship between fundamental rights and freedoms in the global emergency context. Moreover, a case law has started developing within the different jurisdictions. Additionally, constitutional Courts, in different countries, have ruled over potential conflicts of interest among central powers and local ones, and even some decisa of the Court of Justice of the European Union have started “blossoming” in this area. Against the backdrop of this analysis, the paper discusses the main legal problems sparked off by the declaration of the state of emergency, with a focus on the main EU jurisdictions and with glimpses of non-EU countries. The aim of this is to discuss the balance between fundamental rights and liberties in decisa in different legal systems, as well as the interpretation given to principles of proportionality of the public health measures, adequacy, precaution and loyal collaboration and the relationship between freedom and limits to public power. Bearing this in mind, the purpose of the work is to demonstrate that, first and foremost, in Europe there is room for both a formal and a substantial recognition of common rights and liberties in terms of interpretation and application of constitutional traditions, shared by the different Member States. The relevant adherence to these principles is guaranteed by the European Court of Justice. Second, the recovery after the pandemic is an open challenge. An important opportunity for Europe and its Member States is materialising, and this is to take a step forward on the bumpy path toward a European Political Union capable of strengthening a structure weakened by several earthquakes. A path and a project still plenty of pitfalls that needs to regroup around a central core increasing unification among European peoples (art. 1 TEU), which has never meant to be an alternative to national identity. Received: 24.11.2021Accepted: 13.12.2021
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ex ante board connections and director retention result in agency costs to target company shareholders in the form of reduced payment in mergers and acquisitions transaction. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ detailed data of ex ante board connection and director retention in the mergers and acquisition in the UK from 1999 to 2015. Ex ante board connections are measured as proportion of target and acquirer companies’ directors worked on the same board at any time prior to the takeover, while director retention is measured as proportion of target companies’ directors remains on board after the takeover is completed. For mergers and acquisition payment characteristics, the authors examine takeover premium, cash payment percentage and offer price adjustment. Findings The authors find that ex ante board connections and director retention lead to reduced offer prices and lower proportions of cash payment. Notably, when there is no connection and target directors are not retained, the authors find that the bidding companies increase their final offer by £14m more than in other scenarios. The authors also document strong evidence that ex ante board connections lead to a higher probability of director retention. Originality/value The paper highlights that ex ante board connections and director retention will lead to a significant cost on target company shareholders. The authors recommend that a more detailed set of information on ex ante board connections and intended target board retention should be disclosed.
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