The economics of happiness is an influential research programme, the aim of which is to change welfare economics radically. In this paper I set out to show that its foundations are unreliable. I shall maintain two basic theses: (a) the economics of happiness shows inconsistencies with the first person standpoint, contrary claims on the part of the economists of happiness notwithstanding, and (b) happiness is a dubious concept if it is understood as the goal of welfare policies. These two theses are closely related and lead to a third thesis: (c) happiness should be replaced by autonomy as the fundamental goal of welfare economics. To defend my claims I shall show that a hedonic approach to happiness leads to an awkward trilemma. Furthermore, I shall clarify the meaning of “happiness” and “autonomy”, along with their conceptual relationships.

In this paper, we argue that the formulation of typical expert judgementshere referred to as 'judgement calls'entails figuring out how to apply 'general knowledge' to specific circumstances (what we call the 'relevance query'). This requires wisdom, in its original Aristotelian sense, on the part of the scientific expert, as knowledge of laws and initial conditions is not sufficient to make judgement calls. Experts need to take into consideration factors coming from 'outside' the remit of scientific theory, thereby crossing the divide between empirical evidence and socio-political input (what we call the 'expert query'). Arguing against some form of the fact-value distinction is far from an original move, but we will do so both by avoiding the conclusion that expert judgements are nothing but political (against the received view in the sociology of science), and by advocating a somewhat novel perspective. We will claim that expert scientific knowledge proves to be inadequate when it is not integrated with local knowledge, which we define as the knowledge of all factors, which are deemed relevant to the application of general knowledge to specific circumstances. The possession and role of this type of knowledge, though partly an empirical (or sociologically situated) question, can be justified by epistemological reasons.

More than many other Austrians, Mises tried to found aprioristic methodology on a well defined and developed epistemology. Although references to Kant are scattered rather unsystematically throughout his works, he nevertheless used an unequivocal Kantian terminology. He explicitly defended the existence of ‘a priori knowledge’, ‘synthetic a priori propositions’, ‘the category of action’, and so forth.

There is wide belief that Hume's "law" supports the ideal of value-free science. Hume's "law" claims that value judgments cannot logically be derived from purely factual premises. Scientific investigations are concerned with facts and in no way can scientists reach value judgments. In this paper I shall argue that Hume's "law" cannot support the ideal of value-free science. I pinpoint two possible uses of the "law" in defense of the ideal, neither of which is satisfactory. The first use makes the "law" prescriptively empty. The second use leads us in a vicious circle. Furthermore, I shall argue that Hume's "law" blinds us to the reason as to why at times scientists are wrong to derive value judgments from their empirical investigations. In this sense, Hume's "law" blocks scientific investigations.

No abstract