This paper documents trends in bank activity, consolidation, internationalization, and financial firm conglomeration with data on more than 100 countries, and explores the extent to which financial firm risk and systemic risk potential in banking are related to consolidation and conglomeration. The relationship between consolidation, conglomeration and financial risk is documented using financial data on the largest 500 financial firms worldwide and on large banks in about 90 countries. We find that (a) large conglomerate firms did not exhibit levels of risk‐taking lower than smaller and specialized firms in 1995, while they exhibited higher levels of risk‐taking in 2000; (b) highly concentrated banking systems exhibited levels of systemic risk potential higher than less concentrated systems during the 1993–2000 period, and this relationship has strengthened during the 1997–2000 period. We outline research directions aimed at explaining why bank consolidation and conglomeration may not necessarily yield either safer financial firms or more resilient banking systems.
This paper documents trends in bank activity, consolidation, internationalization, and financial firm conglomeration with data on more than 100 countries, and explores the extent to which financial firm risk and systemic risk potential in banking are related to consolidation and conglomeration. The relationship between consolidation, conglomeration and financial risk is documented using financial data on the largest 500 financial firms worldwide and on large banks in about 90 countries. We find that (a) large conglomerate firms did not exhibit levels of risk‐taking lower than smaller and specialized firms in 1995, while they exhibited higher levels of risk‐taking in 2000; (b) highly concentrated banking systems exhibited levels of systemic risk potential higher than less concentrated systems during the 1993–2000 period, and this relationship has strengthened during the 1997–2000 period. We outline research directions aimed at explaining why bank consolidation and conglomeration may not necessarily yield either safer financial firms or more resilient banking systems.
This paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980–1988. A simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution. This model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies. The empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s. This evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator's closure rule. Our econometric evidence, moreover, is consistent with the hypothesis that, for troubled institutions, tangible net worth systematically understates market‐value net worth. In addition, the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed.
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