Over the past two decades, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) has been increasingly discussed by scholars in the fi eld of European integration. While Gary Marks wrote about a four-level arrangement (supranational, national, regional, and local), over time the regional and local levels often became lumped together as 'substate actors' and so easily conceptually interchangeable. This text, however, shows the fallaciousness of this reasoning. In certain circumstances we can fi nd a competitive relationship between cities and regions, positioning themselves against each other for resources and access to national and supranational fora, especially in the context of the new regionalism. The cities have been given substantial support from the European Commission in recent years and we argue that this new constellation may have a remarkable infl uence on relations and possibly also lead to confl icts among local and regional actors in EU multi-level governance. This was possible to be clearly seen in the Czech Republic (CR) between 2012 and 2014, when heated negotiations took place regarding the implementation of the Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI), a fi nancial instrument of EU Cohesion Policy which was implemented on the substate level -i.e., in cities and regions. In the CR this competition took place in a specifi c context, which also infl uenced its outcome.

This article presents the results of evidence-based research into the behaviour of Gazprom and the relevant behaviour of the Russian government in selected countries of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Belarus). The authors’ aim was to determine the scope of involvement by the Russian government in problems that have arisen in supplying these states, and the degree to which these issues have been linked with Gazprom’s conduct and Russia’s foreign policy toward the countries. Another interest was to seek out the key factors that may determine this behaviour in particular environments. To address these goals, the authors monitored specific indicators defined by the strategic approach to energy security (indicators that uncover governmental support, the linking of foreign policy to gas supplies, and misuse of a dominant market position). The core of the research underlying the paper was organized as a set of individual idiographic, theory-guided case studies. Data were gathered from official documents, statistics, articles, analytical studies, and from semi-structured interviews with experts. The exploration revealed that Gazprom has behaved in such a way as to indicate that it is being used as a tool of foreign policy, but the primary factor controlling its behaviour remains the environment in which the company is operating. Two points were crucial: implementation of the IEM rules and—above all—the diversification of sources.

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