BACKGROUNDCandida auris is an emerging and multidrug-resistant pathogen. Here we report the epidemiology of a hospital outbreak of C. auris colonization and infection. METHODSAfter identification of a cluster of C. auris infections in the neurosciences intensive care unit (ICU) of the Oxford University Hospitals, United Kingdom, we instituted an intensive patient and environmental screening program and package of interventions. Multivariable logistic regression was used to identify predictors of C. auris colonization and infection. Isolates from patients and from the environment were analyzed by whole-genome sequencing. RESULTSA total of 70 patients were identified as being colonized or infected with C. auris between February 2, 2015, and August 31, 2017; of these patients, 66 (94%) had been admitted to the neurosciences ICU before diagnosis. Invasive C. auris infections developed in 7 patients. When length of stay in the neurosciences ICU and patient vital signs and laboratory results were controlled for, the predictors of C. auris colonization or infection included the use of reusable skin-surface axillary temperature probes (multivariable odds ratio, 6.80; 95% confidence interval [CI], 2.96 to 15.63; P<0.001) and systemic fluconazole exposure (multivariable odds ratio, 10.34; 95% CI, 1.64 to 65.18; P = 0.01). C. auris was rarely detected in the general environment. However, it was detected in isolates from reusable equipment, including multiple axillary skin-surface temperature probes. Despite a bundle of infection-control interventions, the incidence of new cases was reduced only after removal of the temperature probes. All outbreak sequences formed a single genetic cluster within the C. auris South African clade. The sequenced isolates from reusable equipment were genetically related to isolates from the patients. CONCLUSIONSThe transmission of C. auris in this hospital outbreak was found to be linked to reusable axillary temperature probes, indicating that this emerging pathogen can persist in the environment and be transmitted in health care settings.

BackgroundNosocomial infection of health-care workers (HCWs) during outbreaks of respiratory infections (e.g. Influenza A H1N1 (2009)) is a significant concern for public health policy makers. World Health Organization (WHO)-defined ‘aerosol generating procedures’ (AGPs) are thought to increase the risk of aerosol transmission to HCWs, but there are presently insufficient data to quantify risk accurately or establish a hierarchy of risk-prone procedures.Methodology/Principal FindingsThis study measured the amount of H1N1 (2009) RNA in aerosols in the vicinity of H1N1 positive patients undergoing AGPs to help quantify the potential risk of transmission to HCWs. There were 99 sampling occasions (windows) producing a total of 198 May stages for analysis in the size ranges 0.86–7.3 µm. Considering stages 2 (4–7.3 µm) and 3 (0.86–4 µm) as comprising one sample, viral RNA was detected in 14 (14.1%) air samples from 10 (25.6%) patients. Twenty three air samples were collected while potential AGPs were being performed of which 6 (26.1%) contained viral RNA; in contrast, 76 May samples were collected when no WHO 2009 defined AGP was being performed of which 8 (10.5%) contained viral RNA (unadjusted OR = 2.84 (95% CI 1.11–7.24) adjusted OR = 4.31 (0.83–22.5)).Conclusions/SignificanceWith our small sample size we found that AGPs do not significantly increase the probability of sampling an H1N1 (2009) positive aerosol (OR (95% CI) = 4.31 (0.83–22.5). Although the probability of detecting positive H1N1 (2009) positive aerosols when performing various AGPs on intensive care patients above the baseline rate (i.e. in the absence of AGPs) did not reach significance, there was a trend towards hierarchy of AGPs, placing bronchoscopy and respiratory and airway suctioning above baseline (background) values. Further, larger studies are required but these preliminary findings may be of benefit to infection control teams.

We identified low but escalating risk of severe M. chimaera infection associated with heater-coolers with cases in a quarter of cardiothoracic centers. Our investigations strengthen etiological evidence for the role of heater-coolers in transmission and raise the possibility of an ongoing, international point-source outbreak. Active management of heater-coolers and heightened clinical awareness are imperative given the consequences of infection.

Infectious micro-organisms may be transmitted by a variety of routes, and some may be spread by more than one route. Respiratory and facial protection is required for those organisms that are usually transmitted via the droplet/airborne route, or when airborne particles have been artificially created, such as during 'aerosol-generating procedures'. A range of personal protective equipment that provides different degrees of facial and respiratory protection is available. It is apparent from the recent experiences with severe acute respiratory syndrome and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza that healthcare workers may have difficulty in choosing the correct type of facial and respiratory protection in any given clinical situation. To address this issue, the Scientific Development Committee of the Healthcare Infection Society established a short-life working group to develop guidance. The guidance is based upon a review of the literature, which is published separately, and expert consensus.

SUMMARYA model for contact transfer of micro-organisms by hand has been extended to include representatives of bacterial species responsible for a majority of hospitalacquired infections. The ability of the organisms to transfer from contaminated fabrics to hands and from hands to sterile fabrics was measured, as was their ability to survive on the skin of the hands. There were differences between the species. Staphylococcus saprophyticus transferred well to the hand but not as well from hand to fabric as the other species; it survived well on skin. Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Klebsiella aerogenes and Serratia marcescens transferred moderately well overall and also survived on the skin. These results were in contrast to those obtained with a strain of Escherichia coli and one of Streptococcus pyogenes.The contact transfer model was used to investigate the use of small volumes of alcohol in preventing transfer via the hands. An alcohol handrub of either 0-3 ml 80 % ethanol or 0 3 ml 70 % isopropanol gave reductions in transfer slightly less than that of a soap and water wash. Raising the volume, and consequently the contact time, to 0 5 ml 70 % isopropanol gave a 14000-fold reduction in transfer, statistically indistinguishable from that of a thorough soap and water wash (9800-fold reduction).

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An investigation into two cases of post-operative Bacillus cereus meningitis revealed that hospital linen laundered by a batch continuous washing machine was heavily contaminated by B. cereus spores. The washing machine, detergents, other chemical additives and the water supply were eliminated as the source of contamination. It was found that the linen introduced into the washing machine had a high B. cereus spore content and that this was still present after the wash process. The spores were not killed by either the heat disinfection stage of the wash or the addition of chemical disinfectants and were not removed by the dilution in the process. The multiplication of B. cereus was thought to have occurred on used, damp linen stored in plastic bags, particularly when ambient temperatures were high. An increase in the water flow through the washing machine was the only measure associated with a decrease in B. cereus on laundered linen.