For much of the 20th century, vulnerability to deprivations of health has often been defined by geographical and economic factors. Those in wealthy, usually ‘Northern’ and ‘Western’, parts of the world have benefited from infrastructures, and accidents of geography and climate, which insulate them from many serious threats to health. Conversely, poorer people are typically exposed to more threats to health, and have lesser access to the infrastructures needed to safeguard them against the worst consequences of such exposure. However, in recent years the increasingly globalized nature of the world’s economy, society and culture, combined with anthropogenic climate change and the evolution of antibiotic resistance, has begun to shift the boundaries that previously defined the categories of person threatened by many exogenous threats to health. In doing so, these factors expose both new and forgotten similarities between persons, and highlight the need for global cooperative responses to the existential threats posed by climate change and the evolution of antimicrobial resistance. In this article, we argue that these emerging health threats, in demonstrating the similarities that exist between even distant persons, provides a catalyst for global solidarity, which justifies, and provides motivation for, the establishment of solidaristic, cooperative global health infrastructures.

The right to conscientious objection in the provision of healthcare is the subject of a lengthy, heated and controversial debate. Recently, a new dimension was added to this debate by the US Supreme Court's decision in Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby et al. which effectively granted rights to freedom of conscience to private, for-profit corporations. In light of this paradigm shift, we examine one of the most contentious points within this debate, the impact of granting conscience exemptions to healthcare providers on the ability of women to enjoy their rights to reproductive autonomy. We argue that the exemptions demanded by objecting healthcare providers cannot be justified on the liberal, pluralist grounds on which they are based, and impose unjustifiable costs on both individual persons, and society as a whole. In doing so, we draw attention to a worrying trend in healthcare policy in Europe and the United States to undermine women's rights to reproductive autonomy by prioritizing the rights of ideologically motivated service providers to an unjustifiably broad form of freedom of conscience.

The role and importance of solidarity for effective health provision is the subject of lengthy and heated debate which has been thrown into even sharper relief by the COVID-19 pandemic. In various ways, and by various authorities we have all been asked, even instructed, to engage in solidarity with one another in order to collectively respond to the current crisis. Under normal circumstances, individuals can engage in solidarity with their compatriots in the context of public health provision in a number of ways, including paying taxes which fund welfare state initiatives, and avoiding others when ill. While there has been significant engagement in solidarity worldwide, there have also been high profile examples of refusals and failures to engage in solidarity, both by individual agents, and governments. In this paper I examine the consequence of these failures with reference to the actions of the current British government, which has failed to deliver an effective response to the crisis. This failure has effectively devolved responsibility for responding to the crisis to people who are simultaneously more vulnerable to infection, and less able to do anything about it. I argue that such responses represent mismanagement of a public health crisis, and a rejection of important democratic and egalitarian norms and values.

The concept of solidarity is frequently cited in discussions about distributive justice and what we owe to other people. In addition, solidarity is increasingly the focus of debates in bioethical theory and practice, where it is treated as a concept of fundamental importance, for example in public and global health contexts. Despite the attention that solidarity increasingly receives, however, an exact definition of the term and its role in bioethics remains elusive. Solidarity is understood as a commitment to accept costs to support others with whom people recognise relevant similarities, a definition that we consider particularly fruitful in using solidarity as a guiding principle for policy and practice. Key Concepts Solidarity has recently been gaining more prominence in bioethical, public health and global health debates. The history of solidarity is patterned. Throughout its history, the concept has been imbued with different meanings, with the common denominator being that solidarity is a prosocial notion. The authors define solidarity is as a (shared) commitment to accept ‘costs’ (in the wide sense of the word) to support others with whom people recognise relevant similarities. Defined in this manner, solidarity can be clearly distinguished from related concepts such as altruism or charity. The threat posed by global climate change demonstrates the importance of a solidaristic response by the governments and citizens of all countries. The risks of climate change also provide the catalyst for cooperative action by highlighting an important similarity that exists between all persons – common vulnerability to serious harm. In the context of bioethical policy and practice, solidarity has the potential to ground just, effective public policy and can motivate individuals and governments to participate in programmes intended to alleviate common threats.

The SURFACES project is integrating action on good health and wellbeing [Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3] and conservation of life on land (SDG 15) in the threatened rainforests of Papua New Guinea (PNG), and mapping evidence of similar projects worldwide. Our approach is framed by Planetary Health, aiming to safeguard both human health and the natural systems that underpin it. Our rationale is demonstrated through a summary of health needs and forest conservation issues across PNG, and how these play out locally. We outline differing types of integrated conservation and health interventions worldwide, providing examples from Borneo, Uganda, India and elsewhere. We then describe what we are doing on-the-ground in PNG, which includes expansion of a rainforest conservation area alongside the establishment of a nurse-staffed aid post, and an educational intervention conceptually linking forest conservation and health. Importantly, we explore some ethical considerations on the conditionality of medical provision and identify key challenges to the successful implementation of such projects. The latter include: avoiding cross-sectoral blindness and achieving genuine interdisciplinary working; the weak evidence base justifying projects; and temporal-spatial issues. We conclude by suggesting how projects integrating actions on health and conservation SDGs can benefit from (and contribute to) the energy of the emerging Planetary Health movement.