Service quality preference behaviors of both members are considered in service supply chain (SSC) including a service integrator and a service provider with stochastic demand. Through analysis of service quality cost and revenue, the utility functions are established on service quality effort degree and service quality preference level in integrated and decentralized SSC. Nash equilibrium and quantum game are used to optimize the models. By comparing the different solutions, the optimal strategies are obtained in SSC with quality preference. Then some numerical examples are studied and the changing trend of service quality effort is further analyzed by the influence of the entanglement operator and quality preferences.
This paper investigates channel selection and quality effort in O2O takeout service supply chain consisting of a takeout platform, a catering business, and a distribution rider. By analyzing the three operation modes of platform distribution, business self-distribution, and business self-built platform + distribution, the profit functions of O2O takeout service supply chain members are constructed, respectively. On the basis of game theory, the optimal quality effort and profits are obtained. Combined with numerical simulation, the effects of revenue sharing rate and market size on the optimal quality effort and profits under different scenarios are discussed. The results reveal that O2O takeout platform should cooperate with more catering businesses, and adopt appropriate strategies considering different market sizes of catering businesses. Additionally, the catering business should properly consider the market size and adopt different online and offline prices. Meanwhile, the rider should choose a reasonable quality effort according to the revenue sharing rate.
We investigate the optimal strategy of service supply chain (SSC) including one integrator and two suppliers under a two-layer game structure. Service integrator decides social responsibility and service price, while the two service suppliers with quality preference determine their quality efforts, respectively. By analyzing the two-layer game structure and eight different scenarios of decision models (i.e., CD, DD, ICD, IDD, ISD, SCD, SDD, and SSD), we establish members’ utility functions under different decision models. Meanwhile, based on game theory, the optimal strategies of SSC are obtained. Mathematical reasoning and numerical simulations show that, firstly, quality preference has impact on optimal strategy and members’ utilities under different constraints. Secondly, utility of supply chain with integrator as a leader is greater than the case with suppliers as the leader.
In the closed-loop supply chain, many suppliers opt for self-recycling or entrust retailers to recycle. Under both recycling channels, the member responsible for recycling can undertake or outsource logistics services. This paper investigates how consumers’ environmental awareness and recycling cost-saving affect the optimal combination of recycling channel and logistics-service strategy. To this end, we mathematically formulate the supplier-led Stackelberg game theoretical-framework, and apply the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for constrained optimization. We examine the optimal combination under the impact of consumers’ environmental awareness and recycling cost-saving on profits, environmental impact and social welfare, using numerical analysis. Results demonstrate that as consumers’ environmental awareness and recycling cost-saving remain at a higher level, the supplier and retailer will both achieve maximum profits when the supplier entrusts the retailer to recycle and the retailer undertakes the logistics services. Meanwhile, the third party will choose to be entrusted with services by the supplier, rather than the retailer. To improve supply-chain performance, the retailer should assume social responsibility to recycle and build the logistics-service system.
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